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GLOSSARY OF TERMS
All Work Test The All Work Test (replaced by the Personal Capability Assessment in July
2000) assesses a person’s ability to do any work, and is applied after 28 weeks
of incapacity, for purposes of deciding entitlement to incapacity benefits.
The test looks at ability to carry out a range of activities such as walking,
standing and sitting, and includes an assessment of mental health where
appropriate.
Disability Employment Disability Employment Advisers, mainly based in Employment Service
Advisers Jobcentres, deliver employment support and advice to disabled people and
employers.
New Deal for Disabled The New Deal for Disabled People Personal Adviser Service aims to assist
People Personal people with an impairment or health condition who want to work to do so.
Adviser Service The main client group for the service is people of working age in receipt of
incapacity-related benefits, whose incapacity lasted for 28 weeks or more.
In addition, people at risk of losing jobs because of ill-health may use the
service.  The pilot service is available in twelve areas.
Personal Adviser Within the Personal Adviser Service pilot projects staff who work with
clients on an individual basis, in a case management model, are known as
Personal Advisers.
Volunteer For purposes of incapacity benefits, a volunteer is a person engaged in
voluntary work otherwise than for a close relative, where the only payment
received is in respect of any expenses reasonably incurred in connection
with that work.
1SUMMARY
The Government is committed to helping people claiming incapacity
benefits who would like to enter, re-enter or remain in employment.
Strategies to provide active help and encouragement include a number
of ‘work incentives’:
• therapeutic work
• voluntary work
• incapacity earnings provision
• Work Trial
• Jobfinder’s Grant
• Jobmatch payments
• 52-week linking rule
Therapeutic work, voluntary work and the linking rule have been
generally available across the country; the other four measures were piloted
in 15 areas of Great Britain for one year from April 1999 (Section 1.1).
Taken together, the measures provided a number of different ways of
encouraging and helping people who have been receiving benefits on
the grounds of incapacity and would like to work, by:
• increasing choices available about whether and how to work
• enabling people to try work without financial risks or penalties
• enabling people to work in ways that are most appropriate for them
• reducing risk of perceived insecurity through loss of benefit
• reducing risk of assumed drop in income
• helping to meet initial expenses of going to work
• making work financially worthwhile
Greater understanding was required about clients’ experiences of these
measures, and the way in which they were put into operation (Section
1.2).  The aim was to inform decisions about the development of work
incentive measures for people claiming incapacity benefits.  Objectives
were:
• to explore the way the measures helped people who wanted to work
• to explore clients’ perceptions and experiences, and the impact on
decisions about work
• to explore how key staff promoted and implemented the measures
• to investigate the above in areas with and without a New Deal for
Disabled People Personal Adviser Service pilot
• to provide pointers to making work incentive measures more effective
(Section 1.3)
Chapter 1 - Introduction
The policy context
Research aims and objectives
2A phased approach included discussions with key staff in the Benefits
Agency, Employment Service and New Deal for Disabled People Personal
Adviser Service pilot projects; interviews with 34 clients who had used
one of the measures; and group exercises with administrative staff.  Work
was conducted in five of the 15 pilot areas (Section 1.4).  A qualitative
content analysis was conducted, handling data manually (Section 1.5).
Additional data from analysis of interviews with clients and staff of the
New Deal for Disabled People Personal Adviser Service pilot projects,
collected from a parallel evaluation study, were integrated into this study
(Section 1.6).
Therapeutic work must be done on the advice of a doctor.  It must either
help to improve, prevent or delay deterioration in the condition causing
incapacity and be less than an average of 16 hours weekly; or, be part of
a treatment programme in hospital; or, be done within a sheltered work
environment. It seems likely that so far few incapacity benefits claimants
have been doing any paid work.  There has been some criticism of the
measure, on the grounds of inequity in the way it works and some people
whose condition is unlikely to change have found that this measure is
not useful for them.
At the operational level, applications must be in respect of specific work.
Benefits Agency decision makers decide whether therapeutic work is to
be allowed, based on information from the claimant and GP (Section
2.1).
People were told about therapeutic work by staff in various agencies
after identifying work they thought they might do, or beginning to think
about working.  Some had learned about therapeutic work from medical
personnel during illness, and stored the information until they were ready
to work.  People wanted to do therapeutic work in order to:
• improve or stabilise their condition or prevent recurrence
• improve quality of life
• increase income
• take an early step towards moving off incapacity benefits
Delays in the application process could be stressful, and having to wait
for permission was a problem if people were due to start work.
Therapeutic work was generally helpful, and often improved quality of
life and maintained or improved health condition.  The additional money
was welcome.  Those who said the work had been a step towards more
substantial work of longer hours, more security or greater responsibility
were mainly people recovering from mental illness who used the measure
for a few months.  People who had spent long periods doing therapeutic
work were generally people with more than one impairment, older people
with poor health, and younger people who valued improved quality of
life (Section 2.3).
Research design and methods
Chapter 2 - Therapeutic work
Users’ views and experiences
3Most people who had not done therapeutic work had not heard of it, or
if they had, did not know the rules.  There was considerable interest
when the arrangements were explained especially among people in older
age groups.  However, people talked more about potential improvements
in quality of life and increased income than about using therapeutic work
as a step towards leaving incapacity benefits (Section 2.4).
Disability Employment Advisers and Personal Advisers expected to
respond positively to clients’ interest in therapeutic work and to suggest
this to people if it seemed appropriate.  Benefits Agency front line staff
took different approaches to responding to general enquiries about the
possibility of doing some work while claiming incapacity benefits.  Staff
perceived several roles for therapeutic work, some of which could be
mutually opposing.  There was some unease about the way in which the
measure was being used, as well as recognition of its potential usefulness.
Staff believed that for some clients higher income and increased quality
of life achieved by doing therapeutic work could be a disincentive to
change.
Benefits Agency decision makers had a range of views about
implementation.  Some favoured a strict interpretation of rules; others
believed a more holistic and pragmatic approach supported current policy
aims better.  Such differences in interpretation meant that some clients
might be asked to take an All Work Test relatively soon after starting
therapeutic work.
Applications from people who wanted to work as self-employed were
hard to deal with.  Staff perceived disadvantage in there being no
requirement on claimants to discuss progress while doing therapeutic
work.  Problems arose for clients who started work before seeking
permission.  Staff also perceived problems for clients claiming Income
Support, who did not understand that any earnings over £ 15 weekly
counted pound for pound against Income Support, whether or not the
work was therapeutic.  There had also been problems when the
introduction of the minimum wage took people over the earnings limit
(Section 2.5).
In the parallel study of the New Deal for Disabled People Personal Adviser
Service pilots, few people had used therapeutic work, but those who had
were positive about its scope and purpose, and perceived it as a step
towards full-time employment (Section 2.6).  There was some anxiety
that employers might learn of a client’s ‘disabled’ status when approached
by the Benefits Agency.  Personal Advisers perceived therapeutic work
as useful both as a stepping stone, and as an outcome for some clients.
Views of people who had not done
therapeutic work
Putting therapeutic work into
operation
4• therapeutic work does help some people move towards leaving
incapacity benefits
• there are currently some inequities in access as a result of different
interpretations of the rules by Benefits Agency decision makers
• there was lack of awareness among clients, and relatively low
understanding of the rules
• staff perceived a need for progress monitoring and more active
management
• perceived and actual associations with the Personal Capability
Assessment may deter some people from doing therapeutic work
• improved quality of life and increased income are valued, but there
are inequities for other out-of-work people who might also like to do
this amount of work
• perceptions that doing therapeutic work will identify users to employers
as ill or disabled is likely to remain a barrier to use (Section 2.7)
• helping a client access therapeutic work is not an outcome in terms of
Advisers’ performance targets, which may limit time spent on helping
clients make arrangements
There is now no limit to the amount of work that may be done on a
voluntary basis by people claiming incapacity benefits.  Applications for
permission are dealt with by the Benefits Agency in a similar way as
applications to do therapeutic work, except that there is no medical input.
Previous research with lone mothers claiming Income Support and
unemployed people had suggested that voluntary work tended to be a
transitional activity or indirect route back to work.
There were many examples of participation in voluntary activities while
claiming incapacity benefits.  Not everybody realised they should have
sought permission from the Benefits Agency.  However, those to whom
voluntary work had been suggested by health or social service personnel
remembered also being told that permission was required.
Both reported and unreported voluntary activities could lead people closer
towards paid work, or directly into work.  When voluntary work had
acted as a stepping stone in this way there was usually a good fit between
the activity and the client’s aspirations of the type of paid work they
might eventually do.  Nobody who had asked for permission to do
voluntary work reported any problems (Section 3.3), but deterioration
in health had sometimes brought voluntary work to an end.
There were some stereotyped conceptualisations of voluntary work, such
as working in a charity shop, which tended to rule this measure out of
scope for some people.  Possible disadvantages perceived included
obstructing the search for paid opportunities.  Working without pay was
Issues for policy
Chapter 3 - Voluntary work
Views and experiences of people
who had done some voluntary work
Views of people who had not done
voluntary work
5unacceptable to some people.  It could be hard to understand the
requirement to seek permission if there was no hours limit and no payment
was received (Section 3.4).
Disability Employment Advisers and Personal Advisers perceived a number
of positive roles for voluntary work in supporting moves towards paid
work.  They tried to present voluntary work as a means for further
progression rather than as a way of life on benefits.  Opportunities for
voluntary work tended to concentrate in sectors such as services and
administration, and there were few opportunities in information
technology, construction or maintenance trades (Section 3.5).
Most examples of voluntary work reported by clients of the Personal
Adviser Service pilot projects were in organisations in the public or
voluntary sector (Section 3.6).  Benefits Agency staff expressed less unease
about the voluntary work provision than about therapeutic work, but
believed they received fewer applications to do voluntary work.
• participation in voluntary work may be fairly common, but not all
activities are reported
• being able to do some work on an unpaid basis can contribute to
moves off benefit
• not everybody is prepared to work without pay
• among those who might use the measure there is some lack of awareness,
and some stereotyping of voluntary work which may act to limit
identification of opportunities
• perceived and actual associations between doing unpaid work and being
asked to take a Personal Capability Assessment may deter some people
who might use the voluntary work provision
• helping a client to access voluntary work is not an outcome in terms
of Advisers’ performance targets, which may limit time spent on helping
clients make arrangements (Section 3.7)
Incapacity earnings provision allowed people to earn up to £ 15 a week
(after permitted deductions) without the need for medical
recommendation.  This was a new measure, which had some similarities
with the ‘disregard’ arrangements in Income Support.  Benefits Agency
administrative requirements were kept to a minimum to encourage use.
Those clients selected as having used the measure did not recognise that
they had done so.  It appeared to the researcher that in some cases Benefits
Agency staff used the provision as a first stage in dealing with clients who
applied for permission to do therapeutic work which they had already
begun (Section 4.3).
Among people not recorded as having used incapacity earnings provision
there was widespread lack of awareness, and after explanation, considerable
confusion with Income Support disregards.  It proved hard for people to
Putting the measure into operation
Issues for policy
Chapter 4 - Incapacity earnings
provision
Views and experiences of clients
6fit the measure alongside real job opportunities and family circumstances,
and it was felt to have limited potential in helping moves towards full-
time work (Section 4.4).
There was limited awareness and experience of the measure among staff,
but indications that the measure was sometimes used as a step towards
enabling therapeutic work (Section 4.5).  Personal Advisers and Disability
Employment Advisers who had some experience of the measure saw
advantages in that it was relatively easy to implement and quick to set up,
but saw it appropriate only for small-scale jobs.
In the parallel evaluative study of the New Deal for Disabled People
Personal Adviser pilots there was limited awareness of incapacity earnings
provision among clients and Personal Advisers felt that the measure was
of limited usefulness to clients (Section 4.6).
• levels of awareness among clients were low; the measure was hard to
relate to real-life situations
• Personal Advisers saw limited value in the measure
• where it had been used, this was often as a first step in accessing
therapeutic work, and there was evidence that the measure had been
useful when used in this way
No new claims for incapacity earnings provision were allowed after
7 April 2000 (Section 4.7).
Work Trial is an Employment Service programme which places a person
in a job for up to 15 working days to enable assessment of suitability by
both the person and the employer.  The person remains on benefit without
wages, although daily meal and travel expenses are payable.  The job
tried must be at least 16 hours weekly and should be expected to last at
least six months.  The Employment Service has responsibility for assessing
the workplace and monitoring participant’s progress, and notifies the
Benefits Agency about claimants who are participating.
Among clients recorded as having used Work Trial some would have
been prepared to take their jobs without a Work Trial, but believed the
employer had required a trial period.  Others welcomed the opportunity
to try the job.  The financial implications of working while claiming
benefits had different significance, according to personal circumstances.
No problems were recalled about setting up the arrangements, but payment
of expenses did not always go smoothly.  Those who had done a Work
Trial continued in those jobs and moved off incapacity benefits, but
some jobs did not continue for long, if health broke down.  All felt that
the experience had been helpful, in the long term (Section 5.3).
Among people who had not used Work Trial there was generally limited
awareness of the measure, and mixed views from those who offered
Putting the measure into operation
Issues for policy
Chapter 5 - Work Trial
Views and experiences of clients
7opinions after explanation.  Working without pay was not acceptable to
some, and some thought the employer would get to know more about
their illness or impairment than they wanted (Section 5.4).  Others saw
advantages in being able to try out a job in a work environment, and
would not mind extending their period on benefit, as long as they were
not worse off.
Experience of arranging Work Trials was limited among Advisers.  Positive
views included the security of being able to try work while claiming
incapacity benefits.  The encouragement of the in-work visit by the
monitoring staff could be helpful.  Disadvantages included perceived
bureaucracy and delay in setting up the Work Trial, and delay in recouping
expenses.  Working for no financial reward was unattractive to some
clients. Work Trials were appropriate to relatively few incapacity benefits
claimants so far as many clients needed a period of retraining or work
preparation before entering employment situations.  Some Advisers felt
that, on balance, Work Preparation was a more useful programme for
their clients (Section 5.5.2).  One observation was that some employers
were believed to exploit Work Trial, for example by using it to access
unpaid labour (Section 5.5.1).
In the parallel evaluative study of the New Deal for Disabled People
Personal Adviser pilots’ clients who described having tried work before
deciding to leave benefits did not always identify exactly which benefit
or employment provision they had used.  Staff interviewed in the Personal
Adviser Service evaluation had limited experience of Work Trial (Section
5.6).
• Work Trial can be an incentive to try work, and can lead to some
people moving off incapacity benefits
• jobs achieved at the end of Work Trial may not last long especially if
health deteriorates
• some employers may be exploiting Work Trial
• use may be constrained by perceptions of bureaucracy
• some clients do not want to work without pay, and/ or prefer their
employer not to know about their condition, and are thus unlikely to
use Work Trial
Jobfinder’s Grant is an Employment Service provision which made
available a one-off payment of £ 200 to people who moved off incapacity
benefits into a lower paid job.  It was designed to encourage people to
consider a wider range of jobs by offsetting some of the costs of moving
to work.  Jobs had to be at least 16 hours weekly, expected to last six
months, and paying £ 200 gross weekly or less, and the client must have
had less than £ 2,800 in savings.  Standard application forms were dealt
with by Employment Service Payment Offices and grants paid by giro.
Putting the measure into operation
Issues for policy
Chapter 6 - Jobfinder’s Grant
8All who had applied for a grant had already decided on a job before
discussing the grant, and the availability of the payment was not a strong
influence on their decision to take work.  Not all applications were
successful.  Those who received the grant said it had been helpful, but
they usually had to wait several weeks to receive it (Section 6.3).  The
money usually arrived after earnings had started coming in, so was used
for a variety of household and job-related expenses.  Knowing that the
grant might have to be paid back if the job lasted a short time had been a
worry for some.
Among people who had not applied for Jobfinder’s Grant there was
generally low awareness or understanding of the measure.  Few felt it
was likely to be a key influence on any decisions they might make about
work although, of course, the additional money would be useful.  The
possibility of having to pay it back reduced the attraction of the measure
(Section 6.4).
Disability Employment Advisers and Personal Advisers had varied
experience of advising clients about Jobfinder’s Grant.  Some felt that the
grant did provide an incentive in reducing financial insecurities, but the
time limits were tight.  Some had lost confidence in promoting the measure
after clients had to wait several weeks to receive grants or applications
they had advised had failed (Section 6.5).
In the New Deal for Disabled People Personal Adviser pilots evaluation
many clients interviewed had applied for Jobfinder’s Grant but not all
had been successful.  Some Advisers appeared to be using the grant as a
‘reward’ rather than as an incentive.  The New Deal Interventions Fund
was being used to pay in advance some clients waiting for Jobfinder’s
Grant, or to make payments to clients refused Jobfinder’s Grant (Section
6.6).
• the grant was popular and welcome but did not always act as an incentive
• in terms of reducing financial risks, this effect was reduced by late
delivery
• there were initially some operational problems which acted to clients’
disadvantage
• the measure was used by some staff more as a reward than as an incentive
During the study it was announced that Jobfinder’s Grant would be
replaced.  From April 2001, a job grant of £ 100 will be available to a
range of clients including people moving off incapacity benefits.
Jobmatch provided an extra weekly allowance of £ 50 for people moving
off incapacity benefits into a job of fewer than 30 hours per week, and
was paid for up to 26 weeks.  The measure was originally intended as
part of the ‘tool kit’ of a Disability Employment Adviser or Personal
Adviser, to encourage people to take jobs they would not otherwise
Views and experiences of clients
Putting the measure into operation
Issues for policy
Chapter 7 - Jobmatch
9consider.  Jobmatch was offered at the discretion of Personal Advisers or
Employment Service staff, within local budget allocations.  Applications
were made on standard forms, and payments made directly into bank or
building society accounts or by giro.  As part of Jobmatch, advisers
undertook to help people manage the loss of payments at the end of 26
weeks, in ways appropriate to circumstances.
For some who had used Jobmatch, the main attraction had been the on-
going support that was offered by the adviser during the period in work.
None of these people said they would not have taken their jobs without
Jobmatch, but some felt it would have been harder to stay in work without
the support.  For others, the weekly payment was the attraction, and
influenced the decision to take a job.  People could find themselves no
better off financially, however, and this could lead to giving up work
(Section 7.3).
Awareness and understanding of Jobmatch was generally low among
people who had not used it.  There was considerable interest, after
explanation, among people who thought they might aim towards a part-
time job, but considerable risk was perceived, in respect of the loss of
payments after 26 weeks (Section 7.4) and some concern about potential
interactions with other benefits or tax credits.
There was limited understanding and experience of Jobmatch among
staff. Personal Advisers expressed some unease about the form of discretion
required from them, and the responsibility for providing full information,
six months in advance, about options for clients at the end of the payment
period.  A further disadvantage was that Jobmatch did not support
progressions from therapeutic work to more substantial jobs with the
same employer (Section 7.5).
There was little experience of Jobmatch among clients or staff interviewed
in the parallel evaluation of the Personal Adviser Service pilots (Section
7.6).  There was a general feeling that tax credits were usually a more
suitable form of help for people taking low paid, part-time work.
• the policy intention, of encouraging people to take part-time jobs
they would not otherwise have considered, was not always met for
those who received Jobmatch
• the support element offered as part of Jobmatch was attractive, and
proved effective in helping people stay in work
• the payments could act as a financial incentive, but people did not
always feel better-off in work, and this could contribute to decisions
to leave work
• there was some unease among staff about their responsibilities in respect
of this measure
No new awards of Jobmatch for people leaving incapacity benefits were
made for jobs starting after 30 June 2000 (Section 7.7).
Experiences and views of clients
Putting the measure into operation
Issues for policy
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The current linking rule has been in operation across the country since
October 1998, and was introduced specifically to reduce risk and
uncertainty in moving off incapacity benefits.  The rule enables people
to return to the same benefit if they become incapable again within the
52 week period following their leaving benefits for work or training.
Administration depends on people notifying the Benefits Agency within
one month of ceasing to be entitled to incapacity benefits that they have
started work or training.  Their protection is recorded on the central
computer.  R eclaiming benefits requires new medical certification at this
point.
Not everybody had heard about this rule before taking part in the research.
Some discovered their protection through the rule only after leaving
their job and trying to reclaim benefits; others knew about it while on
benefits.
There was general appreciation, and some people valued the arrangement
highly.  Knowing about the rule had influenced some decisions to take
jobs, and this incentive was reinforced for people who had used it
successfully.  Being influenced by the rule in taking a job and then
experiencing problems or failure in accessing it could be a major blow,
and a disincentive to take work again.  There was some misunderstanding
that the rule protected people against redundancy.
There was no evidence in this study that anybody deliberately gave up
work at the end of 52 weeks in order to regain incapacity benefits.
R eclaiming benefits using the rule could prove harder than expected,
involving more forms and new medical certificates which had not been
anticipated (Section 8.3).
Disability Employment Advisers and Personal Advisers promoted the
rule, often at an early stage in their interaction with clients.  They believed
it had strong influence (Section 8.4) and was an essential component in
welfare to work initiatives for incapacity benefit claimants.
There was some surprise in the Benefits Agency that not more claimants
had registered their protection, and belief that there might be a ‘take-up’
problem at this stage.  They confirmed that some clients expected the
process of reclaiming benefits to be a quicker and simpler process.  Some
Personal Advisers had also been surprised at what was involved for clients
reclaiming benefits, and further training and information was required
when they perceived they had not been giving proper advice (Section
8.5).
In the parallel evaluative study of the New Deal for Disabled People
Personal Adviser pilot projects findings were similar to those reported
Chapter 8 - 52 week linking
rule
Clients’ views and experiences
Putting the linking rule into
operation
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above.  The rule had been a strong influence for some clients who had
taken jobs, but problems had been experienced in reclaiming benefits
(Section 8.6).
• knowing about the rule can influence decisions to take work and the
incentive is reinforced when people use the rule successfully
• the rule reduces some of the risks and anxieties about loss of income
and security, and is generally appreciated by clients
• the incentive effect is currently reduced by lack of awareness, some
anxiety that it will be hard to use, and experiences of problems in
trying to use it
• implementation requires understanding and action by claimants,
Benefits Agency staff and GPs; within this system, some people for
whom the rule was designed do not get access (Section 8.7)
• problems in accessing the rule or reclaiming benefits can have serious
negative outcomes for clients
Tax credits are key components in ‘making work pay’ and were introduced
in October 1999.  Administration is the responsibility of the Inland
R evenue, which is conducting separate evaluative research.  Although
not the main focus of attention in this study, tax credits are important in
the overall context of work incentives, and all clients were asked about
their knowledge and experience.
Claims are made on a standard form, and sent to the Inland R evenue.
Credits are paid, whenever possible, through the wage packet (Section
9.2).  Estimates of clients’ likely entitlement to tax credits had been made
in better-off calculations by Personal Advisers, and for some people these
assessments had been influential in decisions about work, especially when
entitlements were over £ 50 a week.  Estimates of lower entitlements
had been less influential, but people were pleased to have the credits
(Section 9.3).
Awareness of availability of support to boost low earnings was widespread
among those who had not used tax credits, but some were surprised that
the Inland R evenue now had responsibility.  Disadvantages perceived in
tax credits were the household means test, and employers getting to know
personal circumstances (Section 9.4).  In the New Deal for Disabled
People Personal Adviser pilots, the small number of current recipients of
tax credits expressed general satisfaction with the help provided (Section
9.5).
• when the tax credits acted as incentives, this was at the point of decision
making when detailed financial information may be critical
• there was general awareness of availability of support to top up earnings,
but people often did not realise the Inland R evenue was involved
• the potential impact of tax credits as incentives is limited by lack of
knowledge, and the fact that expert help is often needed to work out
potential entitlement (Section 9.6)
Issues for policy
Chapter 9 - Tax credits
Issues arising for policy
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The chapter draws on views of clients and staff on the role of work
incentives in decisions made about work, and discusses some general
issues that might inform policy on how to assist people on incapacity
benefits wishing to undertake some form of paid work.
Incapacity benefit recipients and former claimants did not often use the
language of ‘incentives’.  They talked generally about their views on
working and how they made decisions.  Key influences on decisions
about working included their current and expected health and its impact
on capacity for work, age, family responsibilities, availability of suitable
work, practical support into and during work, and the maintenance of
income security (Section 10.3).
Incapacity benefits claimants are people with a wide range of personal
characteristics, different opportunities and responsibilities, different goals
and aspirations, and at different distances from the labour market.  People
faced different obstacles and barriers when they considered moving towards
work.  Therefore some work incentive measures were relevant, others
not, according to circumstances.  An important issue is the concentration
of the work incentive measures around the point of moving across the
16-hour threshold.  Many incapacity benefits claimants are at an earlier
stage in their progression towards work and might respond more to
incentives to try work (Section 10.4).
Clients emphasised the importance of maintaining income security and
adequacy.  Barriers faced included the risk of losing incapacity benefits
altogether, the transition period in moving off incapacity benefits onto
earnings, feeling unable to afford work, being unable to sustain paid
work, and not understanding the benefits and tax credits systems.  In so
far as the measures removed or allayed any such fears, they could be
influential.  In so far as the measures increased anxieties in any way or
failed to allay fears, their influence as incentives to try work were muted
(Section 10.5).
Management statistics show that take-up of the four pilot measures
remained relatively low throughout the pilot period.  General awareness
and knowledge of the pilot measures among clients was low.  The
availability of the different measures to this client group was not always
understood by front-line administrative staff in the Benefits Agency or
Employment Service.  The ways in which the work incentive measures
were promoted were likely to have affected take-up.  Sometimes the
measures themselves were not suited to what clients needed to help them
move towards work, or there were other, better-suited options available.
Complicated administrative procedures can make some measures
unattractive (Section 10.6).
The knowledge and experience of advisers and benefit staff have an
influence on the use and impact of work incentive measures. One danger
Chapter 10 - Conclusion
The overall context of decision-
making
Dealing with the diversity of
people’s lives
Risk and uncertainty
Take-up of the pilot measures
The role of advisers and benefit
officials
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is that staff make decisions or weight their advice in order to achieve
performance targets rather than necessarily in the optimal interest of their
clients.  Making claimants rely on professional advisers makes them
vulnerable to mistakes and poor advice, and individuals wishing to pursue
their own path back to work, without the intervention of an adviser, can
put themselves at a disadvantage (Section 10.7).
Employers can be as much ‘users’ of the measures as incapacity benefit
claimants themselves.  R esearch findings include a number of concerns
and observations from clients and staff, including fears that use of a work
incentive measure will be met with negative or discriminatory responses
from employers, fears that some employers exploit work incentive
measures, and difficulties in obtaining allowed expenses from employers.
The role of employers in the operation of the work incentive measures
was not included in the terms of reference for this research.  A fuller
understanding would be obtained if employers are included in any future
research (Section 10.8).
There has been particular policy interest in reforming therapeutic work,
removing the requirement that work should have some therapeutic value,
but introducing a time limit.  R edefining ‘permitted work’ might
transform the provision into a stepping stone to full-time employment.
It would not help some claimants with possibly severe impairments who,
under the current benefit rules, have found particular employment niches
using therapeutic work but are unlikely to progress to full-time paid
work (Section 10.9).
The range of benefit and employment measures that are aimed at disabled
people and people with long- term health problems is diverse.
Modifications and extensions to existing provisions add to the range of
help available.  They also bring added complexity and difficulty which
can act against the interests of individual incapacity benefits claimants.
There is scope in developing welfare to work policies aimed at people
with impairments or long-term health problems to make progress in
balancing these tensions to the advantage of claimants, employers, and
policy makers alike (Section 10.10).
The role of employers
The future of ‘permitted work’
Concluding comment
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This report presents findings from qualitative research which contribute
to the evaluation of a number of measures designed to act as work
incentives to people claiming incapacity benefits.  The study was
conducted by the Social Policy R esearch Unit (SPR U) at the University
of York for the Department of Social Security and the Department for
Education and Employment, and took place during 1999-2000.
One of the key policy objectives of the current government is to help as
many people as possible who want to do paid work to achieve this (DSS,
1998).  Included here are people claiming incapacity benefits, who have
not been working because they are disabled or have been ill; and those at
risk of having to leave work and move onto incapacity benefits.  The
Government has adopted a number of strategies to provide active help
and encouragement to such people to enter, re-enter or remain in
employment.  Ways of providing personalised advice and support and
offering a range of options to help moves towards paid work are being
tried in the New Deal for Disabled People Personal Adviser Pilot Projects
(Arthur et al., 1999; 2001) and innovative schemes (Blackburn et al.,
1999).  Making work pay is being tackled through reform of the tax and
benefit system (HM Treasury, 2000).  Alongside go a range of measures
which are designed to remove some of the obstacles or disincentives which
result from the structural interface between earnings, benefits and tax,
and to introduce new incentives which, it is hoped, will influence attitudes
and behaviour, and act to smooth the path from incapacity benefits to
work.
R esponsibility for development and administration of these measures lies
across a number of government departments and their agencies, which
are encouraged to work together and share knowledge and understanding
of the issues involved, as well as co-operate at a practical level within the
thrust of joined-up government.  Four specific measures were introduced
in April 1999 and piloted for one year:
• incapacity earnings provision (which allows claimants to work for small
amounts of money without their benefit being affected)
• W ork Trial (which allows claimants to try employment by filling a job
vacancy for up to 15 working days, during which time they are not
paid but continue to receive benefit)
• Jobfinder’s Grant (a lump sum paid to people entering employment and
coming off benefit)
• Jobmatch payments (an earnings supplement for people entering
employment)
Further details of each of these measures are presented in the introductions
to Chapters 4-7 respectively.
INTRODUCTION1
1.1  The policy context
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Decisions about eligibility for incapacity earnings provision were made
by Benefits Agency decision makers (formerly adjudication officers) at a
local level. Work Trial, Jobfinder’s Grant and Jobmatch were Employment
Service programmes, but staff in the Benefits Agency and the New Deal
for Disabled People Personal Adviser Service were also involved in advising
and enabling access.  The four measures were piloted in 15 areas of Great
Britain, 12 of which had a Personal Adviser Service pilot project.  Staff in
the Benefits Agency, Employment Service, and where relevant the
Personal Adviser pilots were told about the pilot measures, and encouraged
to offer appropriate information and advice to clients, and where
appropriate, practical help in accessing the measures.  Promotion and
advertising of the four measures was dealt with slightly differently across
the 15 areas, according to resources and opportunities available such as
different local sites for promotion.
These four pilot measures formed part of a wider package of measures
generally available to people claiming incapacity benefits, including:
• therapeutic work (which allows claimants to work and claim benefit if
the work is accepted by the Benefits Agency as therapeutic)
• voluntary work (which allows claimants to undertake unpaid work
without their benefit being affected)
• a 52-week linking rule (which allows claimants who come off benefit
to take up paid work to return to their former benefit if they have to
leave work within 52 weeks of starting)
Further details of each of these measures are presented in the introductions
to Chapters 2, 3 and 8 respectively.  R esponsibility for administering
these measures lies solely with the Benefits Agency.
Taken together, the measures provided a number of different ways of
increasing the options available to people who have been receiving benefits
on the grounds of incapacity and would like to work, and removing
some of the barriers, by:
• increasing choices available about whether and how to work
• enabling people to try work without financial risks or penalties
• enabling people to work in ways that are most appropriate for them
• reducing risk of perceived insecurity through loss of benefit
• reducing risk of assumed drop in income
• helping to meet initial expenses of going to work
• making work financially worthwhile
The management team responsible for the four pilot measures kept closely
in touch with administrative staff working in the 15 areas, to monitor the
way in which the measures were being promoted, and their use by clients.
Take-up of some of the measures was slow however, and there was a
need for additional research about the effectiveness of different methods
1.2  The need for research
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of promotion; any potential barriers to take-up and how those barriers
might be reduced.
At the same time, rather little was known about the other measures within
the wider package of work incentives generally available to people claiming
incapacity benefits.  The Department of Social Security had little reliable
information about the way in which therapeutic work and voluntary
work worked in practice, and did not collect centralised administrative
statistics.  Administrative records of people using the 52-week linking
rule were held on the central Benefits Agency computer, but there had
not been a full evaluation of this rule.
There was thus a need for more information both in respect of the
individual measures, and through looking across the whole package of
measures, in a more generic approach.  Policy-makers sought information
about the way in which the measures were put into operation, including
decision making by key administrative staff and interaction between the
relevant agencies.  They sought greater understanding of the way in which
clients and administrators perceived and experienced the different
measures, and the impact of work incentives generally.  More detailed
information would help policy makers achieve the most appropriate work
incentives package for disabled people and people with long-term health
problems.
Other important measures to increase work incentives are the new tax
credits, Working Families’ Tax Credit and Disabled Person’s Tax Credit,
which are administered by the Inland R evenue.  Tax credits were not
the main focus of attention in this research.  However, the generic
approach adopted in the study meant that it was likely to generate some
important early findings about tax credits, which are also presented in
this report.
The aim of the research was to inform decisions about the development
of work incentive measures available to people claiming incapacity benefits.
The focus was on seven specific measures:
• therapeutic work
• voluntary work
• incapacity earnings provision
• Work Trial
• Jobfinder’s Grant
• Jobmatch payments
• 52-week linking rule
1.3  R esearch aims and
objectives
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R esearch objectives were:
• to explore the way in which this package of measures helped disabled
people and those with a long-standing illness to move into, go back to
or retain work
• to explore clients’ perceptions and experiences of these measures, and
the impact on decisions made
• to explore the way in which key staff promoted and implemented the
measures
• to investigate similarities and differences, in respect of the above,
between areas which had a Personal Adviser Service pilot project and
areas which did not yet have such a service
• to provide pointers and suggestions as to how work incentive measures
might be made more effective
The intention of the study was to explore the value and operation of the
measures themselves rather than to evaluate the pilot initiatives.
A qualitative approach was appropriate for exploring the implementation
and use of the work incentive measures, and the perceptions, views and
experiences of clients and staff.  As rather little was known thus far about
some of the measures, a phased approach was adopted, using different
methods of enquiry to build up an overall picture, as follows:
• discussions with key administrative staff
• interviews with clients
• group exercises with administrative staff
Qualitative research seeks to describe, clarify and explain, rather than
providing data that is statistically representative.  The techniques used in
interviews and group discussions involve responsive and open ended
enquiry which encourages people to describe their attitudes and behaviour,
and to reflect on their reasons for holding certain views, or taking particular
courses of action.
Qualitative research aims to provide explanations of perceptions, beliefs
and experiences, but not to quantify the extent to which these exist in a
wider population.  Study groups are selected purposively to achieve
diversity of characteristics and circumstances which enable the
development of conceptual frameworks applicable to the broader
population of interest.
The work for this study was conducted in five of the 15 pilot areas, three
of which had a Personal Adviser Service pilot project and two of which
did not.  The section continues by describing each of the three components
of the research.
1.4  R esearch design and
methods
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1.4.1  Discussions with key
administrative staff
The main fieldwork involved visits to the offices of the key agencies in
four of the five study areas, including one area with a Personal Adviser
Service pilot project led by the Employment Service, one area with a
Personal Adviser Service provided by a consortium of mainly voluntary
and private sector organisations which we call a Contract-led pilot project
(see Arthur et al., 1999, for a detailed explanation of the organisation and
structure of the Personal Adviser Service pilot projects) and two areas
which did not have this service.  Group discussions and interviews were
conducted with key staff.
In the Benefits Agency offices, staff taking part included managers and
team leaders in the incapacity benefits sections, and staff who have direct
responsibility for decision making and implementation of therapeutic
and voluntary work provisions.
In the Employment Service offices, issues were explored with staff working
in Jobcentres, including section managers, Disability Employment Advisers
and advisers working within the New Deal for 18-24 year olds.
In areas with a Personal Adviser Service pilot project, the researchers met
groups of Personal Advisers.
Overall, views and experiences were sought from 16 Benefits Agency
staff, eight Employment Service staff and five Personal Advisers.  All
discussions were moderated using topic guides.  Different guides were
used for each agency, reflecting the different responsibilities of the
participants, but similar areas were explored with all staff, including:
• knowledge and understanding of the work incentive measures
• general perceptions about the measures
• information-giving and advice to clients
• information-giving to and liaison with other agencies/ employers/
general practitioners
• any promotional activities
• putting the measures into operation
• views on clients’ perceptions and use of the measures
• views on the effectiveness of the measures
• suggestions for improvements or strengthening the incentives
Full discussions took around one and a half hours, and were tape-recorded
with permission from the participants.  Shorter tape-recorded interviews
were conducted with some staff who had a more specific responsibility
but could not contribute across all the areas of interest.  Appendix A
presents further anonymised information about the staff who took part in
the research.
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A study group of 34 people was built to include some clients with
experience of at least one of the work incentive measures except the
linking rule.  (The best evidence about incentives provided by the linking
rule was likely to come from people who had not yet used it, as well as
people who had returned to incapacity benefits, so the aim was to explore
perceptions of the linking rule with all clients taking part.)  Policy makers
had particular interest in people who had done therapeutic work, about
whom little was known.
The clients interviewed were drawn from four of the five study areas,
including areas with and without a Personal Adviser Service pilot project.
Appendix A provides details of the sampling and recruitment to the study
group.
Most of the interviews took place in people’s own homes.  In order to
enable representation and participation of people with particular kinds of
illness and impairment there was one proxy interview with a parent, and
two other interviews which involved a third person to help with
communication.  A topic guide was used to steer discussion across relevant
areas, and the interviewers used a standard information card if it was
necessary to explain details of the different measures.  Areas explored
included:
• personal and household characteristics
• experience of work
• personal and household income
• knowledge and understanding of work incentive measures
• process of involvement: gaining awareness; promotion and advice
• experience of implementation: service provision
• experience of use: usefulness, length of time
• views about impact and overall influence on achieving work
• suggestions for improvements or alternative measures
Interviews generally took between an hour and one and a half hours, and
most were tape-recorded with permission.
During the life of the research project, policy makers within government
continued to consider ways in which recipients of incapacity benefits
could be encouraged and helped to move into or back to work.  The
overall policy aim was to create a new working and claiming environment
in which claimants actively engage with public officials in moving towards
work, rather than become merely passive recipients of social security
payments.
Towards the end of the project, therefore, the research team convened a
group of staff from the Benefits Agency, Employment Service and New
Deal for Disabled People pilot projects to discuss and reflect on a number
1.4.2  Interviews with clients
1.4.3  Group exercise with
administrative staff
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of policy ideas under consideration. Some of these were in the public
domain, such as the establishment of a new Working Age Agency
(combining some of the functions of the Benefits Agency and the
Employment Service), while others were in earlier stages of development
or yet to be made public, such as the decision to replace therapeutic
work with new provisions concerning permitted work.
A group of nine members of staff met in August 2000 in York to address
the following questions:
• which kinds of work incentives might be helpful in the new working
and claiming environment?
• what are the issues around work incentive measures for claimants and
staff?
• what obstacles remain within the benefit system, and what would be
needed to remove these?
Small group and plenary group discussions were tape recorded with
permission and transcribed for analysis.
Analysis of the material from each phase of the research was handled
separately, but the approach was similar in each case.  Analysis began
with a reading of the transcripts of tape-recordings and additional notes,
and arrangement of material under key headings, reflecting the main
topics for enquiry and additional themes emerging from the data.  The
data were handled manually, and the analysis was a process of sorting and
comparison, making additional lists and charts, and cross-referencing.
The material was considered in relation to the issues expected to be
important by policy makers and was examined for new items and
emphases.  The researchers sought recurrent themes, patterns, exceptions,
links and explanations.
While this study was in progress further opportunities arose for collecting
data about the work incentives during the latter part of the full evaluation
of the New Deal for Disabled People  Personal Adviser Service which
was running in parallel.  (The principal researchers in this study of work
incentives were also engaged in the collection of data from clients and
staff in the Personal Adviser pilot project evaluation, and had responsibility
for analysis and reporting of that material.)  Sixty people who had been
in touch with the Personal Adviser Service, across all twelve areas in
which the service was established were asked about their use of and views
of the work incentives.  Some of the interviews and group discussions
with Personal Advisers in that study also generated further material about
Advisers’ views on the work incentive measures and their experiences of
advising clients about them.  This additional material has been integrated
into this report. The final report from the evaluation of the Personal
Adviser Service pilot projects (Arthur et al., 2001) provides details of
these series of interviews and discussions.
1.5  Analysis
1.6  Additional material
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Chapters 2-8 address each of the work incentive measures separately, and
Chapter 9 is concerned with tax credits.  These chapters integrate the
research evidence from staff in the Benefits Agency, Employment Service
and Personal Adviser Service pilot projects, clients who have used the
measure and those who have not.  Additional qualitative material collected
during the full evaluation of the Personal Adviser Service pilot projects is
also used in these chapters. Chapters 2-9 conform to a common format:
• policy context; rules of entitlement and administrative procedure; and
what was known already from research
• clients’ perspectives on the role of the measure, perceived usefulness,
and impact on decision making
• putting the measure into operation: staff views and experiences
• additional findings from the parallel research on the New Deal for
Disabled People Personal Adviser pilot projects
• issues arising for policy
The final concluding chapter looks at the overall context, and draws
together what has been learned about the role of work incentives for
people claiming incapacity benefits, and the implications for policy
development.
1.7  The framework of the
report
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The Benefits Agency assesses whether people are incapable of work for
purposes of qualifying for:
• Incapacity Benefit
• Severe Disablement Allowance1
• Income Support, on the basis of incapacity for work
• the disability premium within Income Support, Housing Benefit and
Council Tax Benefit, if entitlement depends on incapacity for work
• National Insurance credits for incapacity
In some circumstances, people may undertake some kinds of work without
being treated as capable of work, and there has long been provision to
allow so-called ‘therapeutic work’.  Therapeutic work must be:
• done on the advice of a doctor AND either
• must help to improve, prevent or delay the deterioration in the disease
or disablement which causes the incapacity to work, and be less than
an average of 16 hours weekly or
• be part of a medically supervised treatment programme while a person
is a patient at a hospital or similar institution or
• be done as part of a sheltered work scheme for disabled people
In all cases earnings must not exceed £ 58.002  (net of income tax, National
Insurance contributions and one half of contributions to an occupational
or personal pension scheme, work expenses and up to £ 60 a week of
permitted child care charges).
The provision enables people to do some work on the basis of medical
advice. In addition to the medical and therapeutic effect, the measure
might also help some people to stay in touch with work, and maintain
confidence and skills which will be helpful if they are eventually able to
move into work.
At the time of the interviews with clients and staff in the earlier stages of
the project, the therapeutic work provision outlined above was still in
operation.  By the end of the project and the final group exercise with
staff, it was known to the research team that new provisions relating to
permitted work were planned to replace therapeutic work in 2001.
Discussion of the possible impact of changes in the permitted work
arrangements is contained in the final chapter.
2 THERAPEUTIC WORK
2.1  Introduction
2.1.1  The policy context
1 Under the Welfare R eform and Pensions Act 1999 Severe Disablement Allowance
will be abolished for new claimants from April 2001.
2 1999-2000 rate, when the study was conducted.
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Systematic data about the numbers of people claiming incapacity benefits
who are allowed to do some therapeutic work have not been routinely
collected, but it seems likely that few incapacity benefits claimants have
been doing any paid work.  A survey of 2,263 people who left Incapacity
Benefit during 1996 (Dorsett et al., 1998) showed that only four per cent
had done any paid work during the spell on benefit, and two per cent
some unpaid work.  Six per cent of participants in the New Deal for
Disabled People Personal Adviser Service pilot projects surveyed in 1999
(Arthur et al., 1999) reported having done some therapeutic work while
claiming incapacity benefits.  If we look to studies on other groups of
clients, there is some evidence that small jobs of fewer than 16 hours a
week can boost working prospects (Iacovou and Berthoud, 2000).  It
seems possible that for some disabled people or people with a long-term
health condition, doing some therapeutic work might be a step towards
a more substantial job, and could therefore act as a work incentive.
There has been some criticism of therapeutic work on the grounds of
inequity in the way that it works (Mental Health Foundation, 1996;
Social Security Advisory Committee, 1997).  The requirement that the
work must improve, or prevent or delay deterioration in their condition
does not fit the situation of some people whose impairment or health
condition is unlikely to change, for example some people with learning
difficulties.  Some have found that this measure is not useful for them,
and have felt constrained in the opportunities they might take to do
some work (Simons, 1998).  Some people believe that applying for
therapeutic work has triggered a review of eligibility for incapacity benefits
(O’Bryan et al., 2000).  Believing that this might happen may make
people reluctant to try work.
The general expectation is that a person who is interested in doing some
work using the therapeutic work rules contacts the local Benefits Agency
office by telephone or letter, and the enquiry is eventually dealt with by
staff who are short-term benefit raters.  The rater takes basic details of what
the work involves, and explains the rules. The application must be in
respect of specific work, so the Agency requires information about the
nature of the job, what it entails, the name of the employer, the hours of
work and level of earnings.  A letter from the person’s GP is also required
to progress the application, and if further information is required the
Benefit Agency writes directly to the GP, enclosing a form for provision
of medical information, and views on the relationship between the
proposed work and the patient’s medical condition.
The application form and supporting letter from the GP is then forwarded
to a decision maker.  The decision maker usually has no direct contact
with the incapacity benefits claimant, but decides whether therapeutic
work is to be permitted, based on the information available.  The rater
then explains the decision, and if permission has been given, seeks
confirmation in writing that the person is doing the work agreed.  Any
2.1.2  What was known already
2.1.3  Administrative procedures
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work undertaken before the GP has given advice is not permitted as
therapeutic work.
This study provided an opportunity to explore further the experiences of
people who had done therapeutic work while claiming incapacity benefits,
and to assess whether this way of working had helped people move to
more substantial work.  It was possible to ask those who had not done
any therapeutic work about their knowledge and understanding of this
measure, and whether they believed that it might be useful to them in
the future.
Staff who administer, or provide advice about therapeutic work include
Benefits Agency raters and decisions makers, Employment Service staff
and New Deal Personal Advisers.  The way in which therapeutic work is
currently explained is likely to be critical in encouraging people to use
the measure, especially as the measure has not previously been actively
promoted as a ‘step towards work’ for incapacity benefits claimants.  We
therefore explored with staff from all the agencies their views about
therapeutic work and their experiences of the way the measure is put
into operation.
This section presents the views and experiences of people who had done
some therapeutic work.  People were selected for the study because they
were recorded as currently doing some therapeutic work and had applied
for permission within the last two years.  There were therefore no
examples, in this study, of people who had been doing therapeutic work
for several years.
Among the users some only discovered the arrangement after identifying
work they thought they might do, or after they were beginning to think
about going back to work.  People investigated what would happen to
their benefits if they took work after seeing a job advertisement, or being
approached by a previous employer or a friend who knew about their
situation, or when they were just feeling better.  They were told about
therapeutic work by Benefits Agency staff, Employment Service Disability
Employment Advisers, Personal Advisers or other advice workers.  Some
had been told about therapeutic work by a doctor or psychiatrist during
their illness, and stored this information until they felt well enough to
start thinking about options for moving on.
People who had made applications were motivated by wanting to do
small jobs in order to improve or stabilise their condition, or prevent
recurrence; to improve their quality of life; to engage with the world of
work, and, for some, to increase their income.
People with mental health problems stressed their hope that doing some
work would contribute to recovery, for example by increasing their
confidence, concentration, and social interaction.  Having even a small
2.2  The approach taken
2.3  Users’ views and
experiences
2.3.1  Finding out about
therapeutic work
2.3.2  Perceived role of therapeutic
work
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job would also be an important demonstration to themselves that they
were going to get better, and would help to maintain morale for themselves
and their families.  People with musculo-skeletal problems hoped that
having some work would help to maintain mobility, or take their mind
off pain.  Other expected improvements in quality of life included the
relief of boredom, getting out of the house, and having people to talk to.
People taking an early step towards work typically described being on
medication, or still attending day centres or day hospitals for treatment
for mental illness.  They still had distressing symptoms, fatigue, loss of
confidence, and for some, problems relating to other people.  They were
not expecting and did not want to move off incapacity benefits at this
stage, but saw therapeutic work as an opportunity that suited them.
People varied in the importance attached to being able to increase their
income.  The additional income could be much less important than having
the work.  For those with pressing financial problems, and those who
had previously been family breadwinners, being able to have earnings on
top of benefits was important.  There had been some surprise in discovering
how much they were allowed to earn.
It was hard for people to remember exactly how arrangements for
therapeutic work had been made if they had various interactions with
the Benefits Agency and their GP.  People who were unsure whether
they should try a job remembered talking to their GP first, but others
wanted first to know about the rules, and implications for their benefits.
GPs and consultants had generally been supportive and encouraging;
nobody had felt pressured by medical staff to move more quickly than
they wanted, and nobody was put off the idea for medical reasons.
Benefits Agency staff with whom matters had been discussed at a local
office or using Freephone numbers were also generally remembered as
helpful, even when explaining to people who had already started work
that they should have asked for permission first.  Criticism about
information available came from a person who had been unable to work
out, from the Benefits Agency leaflets obtained, whether people were
allowed to have two separate jobs.
Those who found the application form hard to deal with were generally
people with dyslexia or mental illnesses which made it hard to concentrate.
Benefits Agency staff who had helped with forms were generally
remembered as helpful.  Waiting for a reply could be stressful, however.
Some doctors took a long time to deal with their form, or sent incomplete
forms or wrong information; and some applicants were asked for further
information.  People whose illness meant that they suffered extreme
anxiety, panic attacks or paranoia sometimes nearly gave up at this stage.
Having to wait for permission was worrying if people were due to start
work.  Anticipation of this kind of difficulty could lead to non-declaration
2.3.3  Making the arrangements
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of work.  Another reason for starting work before getting in touch with
the Benefits Agency was wanting to test out whether the job was suitable
before dealing with forms and enquiries.
A person who had been refused permission on the grounds that the work
described seemed unlikely to improve her condition had felt humiliated
that she had not been believed.  She had continued to do the same work,
using the Income Support disregard provision, and was certain that the
work helped her mental condition.
By the time of the research interview, people had spent different lengths
of time doing therapeutic work.  Continuous periods of therapeutic work
ranged from four to 15 months, and completed spells of therapeutic work
included periods of two to five months.
In general, people who were doing therapeutic work, or had used this
arrangement in the past, thought it had been helpful.  The jobs, as people
had hoped, had provided structure to their lives, motivation, interest,
companionship and social status.  The social interactions required
improved mental conditions or helped to prevent relapse.  Disliking a
job, or finding it boring could still be a generally helpful experience,
proving to a person that they could do more and should move on.
A wide range of jobs had been done as therapeutic work including
teaching, shop and garage work and cleaning.  Hours worked varied;
while some people thought there might be an opportunity to build up
current hours in the same job, others were engaged on activities which
were likely to remain small-scale.
The additional money was welcome.  Those who had hoped earnings
would ease financial pressures started to clear bills.  Being able to afford
additional items was appreciated.  People generally saw positive outcomes
from their therapeutic work, whether or not they had moved any further
towards financial independence.
Policy interest in therapeutic work focuses mainly on whether it has
helped people to move off incapacity benefits, or brought them any nearer
towards this.  In this study, people who said that doing therapeutic work
had been a definite step towards more substantial work were mainly
people who had been recovering from mental illness.  Their jobs had
helped their condition, leading them to take a second part-time job and
move off incapacity benefits, or start applying for full-time jobs, hopeful
that they would soon be off benefits.  Periods of therapeutic work could
be fairly short for such people, sometimes just a few months, but people
whose condition improved very gradually could spend 15 months doing
therapeutic work before taking the next step towards leaving incapacity
benefits.
2.3.4  Perceived usefulness
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There were also examples of people who believed that they would be
moving towards work again later on, and said their current therapeutic
work was serving to keep them in touch with work.  Such people were
often still receiving hospital treatment, but hopeful that their condition
would improve in the long term.  Included here was a person whose
therapeutic work had already lasted 12 months.
Those who did not expect to come off incapacity benefits in the foreseeable
future were generally people with more than one impairment, older people
whose health was generally poor, and younger people with severe
conditions who valued their therapeutic work more as a means of
improving quality of life than as a step towards full-time work.  In this
group were people whose therapeutic work had already been 12-15
months, and who hoped they could continue to go on working in this
way.
People who had not done therapeutic work were asked for their views
on the measure, and whether they had thought of working in this way.
Most had not heard of therapeutic work.  A few who had heard it was
possible to do some work with their doctor’s permission had not thought
hard about this, either because they were aiming at full-time work
eventually, or because they were not yet ready to move towards work.
Those who had heard about therapeutic work often did not know the
rules.  A few who had talked to a Personal Adviser about the possibility
of doing some therapeutic work or begun an application had gone no
further, either because the job opportunity had gone or their health had
let them down.  It also appeared that applications to be allowed to do
some paid work on a therapeutic basis had sometimes been dealt with by
the Benefits Agency under the incapacity earnings provision, and this is
discussed later.
Among those who had not heard of therapeutic work were people who
did not know what the word ‘therapeutic’ means.
It could be a surprise to discover from the researcher that some people
were allowed to earn as much as £ 58 (1999 rates) on top of incapacity
benefits, and some people were shocked and angry that they had not
known this.  Not everybody believed that the researcher’s information
was correct.  There was, however, considerable interest, especially among
people in older age groups. Some had often thought that what they
needed was ‘a little job’ to get them out of the house, moving around and
interacting with other people but had believed this was forbidden. Those
who thought it would be relatively easy to find part-time work, such as
a morning’s cleaning work, a few hours’ driving, or catalogue delivery
thought their GP would agree this would be good for them. Such people
talked more about potential improvements in quality of life and increased
income than about using therapeutic work as a step towards more
substantial work.
2.4  Views of people who had
not done therapeutic work
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Anxieties and possible disadvantages identified included:
• problems in getting authoritative information about what was permitted
• a possibility that some (other) people might be reluctant to move off
incapacity benefits
• loss of Income Support, and valued passported benefits
• loss of, or reduction in, Housing Benefit
• being reassessed as capable of work, and losing incapacity benefits
altogether
• not wanting to be stigmatised by associations with ‘therapy’
• attitudes of employers towards people doing therapeutic work
This section presents the views of staff in the three key agencies about
the role of therapeutic work and the way in which it is used, and their
experiences of putting the measure into operation.
Staff in all agencies believed that among the general population there was
widespread awareness that people claiming incapacity benefits were
allowed to do small amounts of work.  However, real understanding of
different arrangements, including therapeutic work, was believed to be
low.
Benefits Agency front-line staff in the pilot areas expected to provide full
information about therapeutic work if this was requested.  They also said
they tried to be helpful if people made general enquiries about whether
it was possible to do any work while claiming incapacity benefits, for
example suggesting that a Personal Adviser or Disability Employment
Adviser could discuss options and possible moves towards work.  By
contrast, in a Benefits Agency office outside the New Deal for Disabled
People Personal Adviser Service pilot areas front-line staff were instructed
to respond to general enquiries with strong advice that people were not
allowed to claim incapacity benefits and do paid work.  This illustrates
the ‘change of culture’ that has to be achieved at the administrative level
in order to encourage more incapacity benefits claimants to think about
trying or returning to work.
Personal Advisers and Disability Employment Advisers expected to
respond positively to interest in therapeutic work, and to suggest this to
people if it seemed appropriate.  Disability Employment Advisers suggested
that they were particularly likely to suggest therapeutic work to people
who felt they could only do a few hours’ work, and people who felt they
needed some form of work experience before going further with their
plans to work.  It was important to explain the rules carefully and help
people think how their intended work fitted both their medical condition
and capacity for work, and the requirement that the work would be
‘therapeutic’.  Disability Employment Advisers said that some incapacity
2.5  Putting the measure into
operation
2.5.1  Information dissemination
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benefits claimants who knew that an All Work Test3  was due came into
Jobcentres at this point to check out what would happen if they lost their
incapacity benefits, and this provided an opportunity to discuss various
ways of going back to work.  Indeed, some clients decided to come off
incapacity benefits themselves at that point, rather than ‘fail’ the All Work
Test.  Those whose eligibility for incapacity benefits was confirmed after
an All Work Test, however, might then go back to the Disability
Employment Adviser to discuss therapeutic work.
Staff in the key agencies perceived various ways in which people used
therapeutic work:
• to test the suitability of a job
• to test their capacity for work, and the impact of work on health or
impairment
• to gain some experience of work after a period out of the labour
market, or to make a first move towards work
• to increase income
• to improve or maintain quality of life
Perception of such variety in roles, some of which could be mutually
opposing, led to some scepticism, dissatisfaction and unease about the
way in which the measure was currently being used, as well as recognition
of its potential usefulness.  Added to this were the general confusions and
misunderstanding which they perceived among incapacity benefit
claimants, which could obscure its role.  For example, staff in all agencies
believed that some people thought that therapeutic work was a purposeful
arrangement to enable incapacity benefits claimants to boost incomes.
Staff believed that for some people, therapeutic work did provide an
incentive to try work but that it rarely had an effect as a stepping stone,
because people were often reluctant to take the next step towards more
substantial work.  Staff believed that the level of incomes that could be
achieved by a combination of benefits and therapeutic work, plus the
consequent improvement in claimants’ quality of life could be a strong
disincentive to change.
Benefits Agency decision makers had a range of views about the
implementation of therapeutic work.  One view was that the rules of
entitlement were strict.  Hence, applications were often disallowed,
especially for people with physical impairments or back problems, while
it could be easier to agree that mental health problems would be improved
by some work.  Staff who interpreted rules strictly also emphasised that
the work must be helpful to the person’s main disabling condition.  This
3 The All Work Test was replaced by a Personal Capability Assessment in April 2000.
In this study, clients and staff talked in terms of the All Work Test, and this term is
used throughout, when reporting their views and experiences.
2.5.2  Perceived role of therapeutic
work
2.5.3  Implementation
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could lead to disallowed applications if people or GPs laid stress on the
value of the work in helping a secondary condition, for example depressive
illness that had developed since the person last worked.  Some staff said
that strict interpretation of the rules would mean that they should only
accept applications instigated or suggested by the GP.
A different view was that the rules allowed some flexibility in
interpretation.  This allowed a more holistic and pragmatic approach to
applications for therapeutic work which supported current policy aims,
especially for people who had been away from work for a long time, and
people who did not understand the formal rules.  Disability Employment
Advisers and Personal Advisers recognised that different decision makers
could take different approaches, and some Benefits Agency staff pointed
to a difference in culture between themselves and Personal Advisers as to
the role of therapeutic work and what arrangements should be allowed.
Difference in interpretation between individual decision makers also led
to different approaches to decisions about when to ask clients who applied
to do therapeutic work to undertake an All Work Test as a condition of
continued receipt of incapacity benefits.  Two distinct approaches were
identified in the research.  Some Benefits Agency decision makers took a
rigid approach and required claimants to undertake an All Work Test
relatively soon after beginning therapeutic work.  They might, for
example, bring forward the date for a routine re-assessment of the
claimant’s incapacity benefits award.  Other decision makers took a more
flexible and pragmatic approach which they saw as supporting claimants’
efforts to establish themselves in the labour market.  Decision makers
taking this approach saw no advantage in bringing forward the timing of
an All Work Test, which they thought might undermine people’s
confidence and increase their anxiety about losing their benefits.  They
saw their approach as reinforcing current policy aims of encouraging
people to try work.
Applications from people who wanted to do therapeutic work on a self-
employed basis, for example on a family farm or doing craft work, were
often hard to deal with, in terms of verification of earnings or hours of
work.
R eviews of incapacity benefits claims with therapeutic work provision
were reported to take place either at six monthly or 12 monthly intervals,
but do not routinely have any new medical input.  This was seen as a
disadvantage by staff in the Benefits Agency.  They perceived a missed
opportunity to review the claimants’s overall situation, and suggested
that some people who might have been encouraged to move towards
work could become ‘stuck’ on therapeutic work, because there was no
requirement to discuss progress with anyone.  Some claimants were
reported to have been doing therapeutic work for several years.
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A number of problems were perceived by staff in the Benefits Agency,
Employment Service and New Deal pilots.
Benefits Agency staff felt that a lack of proper understanding of therapeutic
work by incapacity benefits claimants led to unnecessary administration,
and, in combination with lack of ongoing medical review, led to
inappropriate use.  Some claimants found themselves in a difficult situation
when they reported having already started work when they applied for
permission.  This could lead to misrepresentation of circumstances;
financial penalties and discouragement.
Disability Employment Advisers and Personal Advisers had observed the
negative consequences of refusal of an application, or the bringing forward
of an All Work Test.  They felt that the different roles which therapeutic
work filled, along with the difference in culture and approach between
themselves and the Benefits Agency, and difference in interpretation by
individual decision makers had led to lack of clarity of purpose, and
unfairness in access.
Staff believed that people claiming Income Support (with or without
incapacity benefits) sometimes did not understand that any earnings over
£ 15 counted pound for pound against their Income Support whether or
not the work was therapeutic.  This could lead to financial problems, in
addition to disappointment and frustration.
Staff in all agencies in areas in which there were specialist facilities for
people with learning difficulties reported problems that had developed
since the introduction of the minimum wage.  Clients who had found
particular niches in a work environment, receiving small payments for
limited tasks, had lost jobs and/ or benefit when the minimum wage was
introduced.  If employers had raised wages in line with the minimum
wage, some clients were taken over the earnings limit for therapeutic
work, and lost incapacity benefits.  If employers took the view that clients
were not productive enough to be paid the minimum wage, some lost
jobs.  Staff reported how serious the implications had been for their
clients, and were themselves frustrated by what had happened, especially
if setting up the previous arrangements had involved major investment
of staff time and inter-agency co-operation.
Disability Employment Advisers and Personal Advisers pointed out that
helping clients access therapeutic work did not count in terms of their
own work-related targets.  Inevitably, this was likely to constrain the
amount of time they spent on such work, and some opportunities for
clients were lost.
Clients of the Personal Adviser Service pilot projects who took part in
the evaluation research were at different distances from the labour market
when interviewed.  At one end of the spectrum were people who had
2.5.4  Problems perceived
2.6  Evidence from the New
Deal for Disabled People
Personal Adviser pilots
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lost contact with the labour market and were economically inactive, and
others who were in the early stages of a possibly long path back to work.
At the other end, some people were in paid work and no longer in
receipt of incapacity benefits, or were close to the full-time labour market,
perhaps working in a part-time or voluntary capacity, or actively looking
for jobs.  It was this latter group who were most likely to have heard of
therapeutic work, though there were few clients in the study who were
using it.
Knowledge about the principles of therapeutic work, i.e. that it was
permissible to work up to a maximum number of hours within an upper
limit on earnings, was generally correct.  However, New Deal clients
were less certain of the details.  There were varying estimates of the
upper limit on earnings and some uncertainty about whether or not
there was a time limit attached to the provision.
Almost all clients who had either heard of, or used, therapeutic work
generally commented positively about its scope and purpose.  For some,
therapeutic work was either already providing or, it was hoped, would
help to provide a transitional step back to full time employment.  For
example, therapeutic work had meant that it was possible to try work
without risk of losing benefit, and thus bring security needed to make
further progress.  It had been possible to take advantage of opportunities
that arose for small jobs that suited people’s circumstances and health
condition or impairment.  Some problems had arisen for people doing
therapeutic work.  One person with earnings close to the upper limit had
to ask to reduce her hours when the minimum wage was introduced.
Having to pay travel expenses could mean being no better off financially
as a result of working.  Some kinds of work were hard to fit with the
therapeutic work rules, for example taking part in one-off performance
arts events.
Not all New Deal Personal Adviser Service pilot clients saw therapeutic
work as a transitional stage.  Some older clients found the arrangement
suitable to their needs, and hoped to continue.
Among clients who had not done therapeutic work there was some anxiety
that an employer might learn of their ‘disabled’ status when approached
for details about the job by the Benefits Agency.  This had led to decisions
not to apply for therapeutic work.  Others were anxious that doing
therapeutic work might be interpreted by the Benefits Agency as capacity
for work, and lead to loss of incapacity benefits.
Personal Advisers interviewed in the New Deal for Disabled People
Personal Adviser Service evaluation research were generally knowledgeable
about the eligibility rules.  They saw therapeutic work as serving one of
two purposes.  First, it could represent an ‘outcome’ for their client, an
employment status beyond which they did not want to progress.  Secondly,
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it could be a stepping stone to full-time employment, a period during
which their client gained experience and confidence, and after which
they would progress to work of over 16 hours.
Findings from incapacity benefits claimants and staff in key agencies suggest
that:
• being able to do some work while still claiming incapacity benefits
does help some people move towards more substantial jobs, and
eventually leave incapacity benefits
• the current therapeutic work rules provide one avenue along which
some people can move to achieve this progression
• there are currently inequities in access to therapeutic work, as a result
of different interpretations of what constitutes ‘therapeutic work’
• among those who might use the measure, awareness is low
• among those who are aware of the measure there is relatively low
understanding of the rules, which leads to perverse outcomes in terms
of increased administration; and non-purposeful breaking of rules, such
as starting work before seeking permission
• there may be some loss of opportunity for incapacity benefits claimants
to get active help in arranging therapeutic work because Disability
Employment Advisers and Personal Advisers perceive no direct
outcomes in terms of their own performance targets
• a staff view was that if the measure is to be generally adopted and
promoted as a way of helping people progress from benefits to work,
there is a need to monitor progress and provide more active
management and advice
• perceived and actual associations between doing therapeutic work and
being asked to undergo a Personal Capability Assessment are likely to
deter some people who might do therapeutic work
• applications are slowed by the requirement to seek medical opinion.
However, some clients valued the input from their GP, if they were
anxious that working would make their condition worse
• apart from its role as providing a way of taking a step towards more
substantial work, therapeutic work has an important role in enabling
people who do not expect to be able to take further steps towards
work to improve their quality of life, both in financial terms and in
respect of the personal satisfaction which work brings.  This role is
highly valued.  However, this brings into focus inequities with other
groups of out-of-work people, for example long-term unemployed
people, who might also like to increase their benefit income by up to
£ 58.50 (2000-2001 rate)
• the current name of this measure has negative connotations for some
people who associate it with ‘therapy’
2.7  Issues for policy
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• some people do not want their employers to know about their health
history, and a belief that using measures which might identify them as
‘ill’ or ‘disabled’ is likely to remain a barrier to the use of measures
such as therapeutic work (even when this belief is wrongly founded)
• the introduction of the minimum wage has led to particular problems
for some clients who lost incapacity benefits or jobs when wage rises
took them over the earnings limit for therapeutic work
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3 VOLUNTARY WORK
Voluntary work is another permitted work activity for people receiving
incapacity benefits or National Insurance credits on the grounds of
incapacity to work.  There is now no limit to the amount of work that
may be done as a volunteer, a previous 16 hours limit having been removed
in October 1998.  Definitions applied to voluntary work are slightly
different, according to which benefit the volunteer is claiming.  This
may lead to some differences in the way that Benefits Agency decision
makers interpret rules at a local level (see Glossary).
For some people, doing some work in a voluntary capacity may be a
helpful step on the way into or back to work.  Working in a voluntary
capacity may provide opportunities to test interests and try out skills, and
to gain experience in social interaction.  It may be seen as relatively ‘risk-
free’ as there are no direct effects on the level of benefit received.  In
addition to a role in helping some people move towards paid work,
voluntary work also provides an opportunity for interesting and fulfilling
activity for some people who may be unlikely to be able to sustain paid
work.
There are no centralised administrative records relating to this measure.
In a survey of early participants in the New Deal for Disabled People
Personal Adviser Service pilot projects (Arthur et al., 1999) 19 per cent
had been doing some voluntary work.  Disabled people interviewed in
that study explained that doing some voluntary work could help to
maintain activity and quality of life while claiming benefits, and could
provide opportunities to maintain or develop skills, which might be useful
when the time came to think about working.
If we look to other client groups, among lone mothers claiming Income
Support, and unemployed people, voluntary work was more of a
transitional activity or an indirect route back to work than a direct stepping
stone into employment (Thomas et al., 1999).
In general, administrative procedures for dealing with applications for
permission to do voluntary work are dealt with by local Benefits Agency
offices in a similar way to applications to do therapeutic work, except
that there is no medical input.  Again, the application must be in respect
of a specific activity, and to prevent loss of benefit people are advised to
seek permission in advance of starting work.  The Benefits Agency rater
assembles information from the client about the nature of the job, what
it entails, the name of the employer, hours of work, and details of any
expenses which the client expects to claim.  This information is then
forwarded to a decision maker who decides whether the voluntary activity
is to be permitted.
3.1  Introduction
3.1.1  The policy context
3.1.2  What was known already
3.1.3  Administrative procedures
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At the time of the study, people engaged on activities on employers’
premises as part of a Work Preparation4  programme organised by the
Employment Service were also required to make an application so that
this activity could be allowed under the voluntary work provision.
In this study, all clients were asked whether they had considered doing
voluntary work while claiming incapacity benefits or credits, whether
they had sought permission from the Benefits Agency for their activities,
and what impact the activity had made on moves towards work.  Those
clients who had been selected for the study as people to whom the Benefits
Agency had given permission for voluntary work were asked about their
experience of this procedure.  Staff in all agencies were asked about their
experiences in advising clients about voluntary work, and the way the
measure is put into operation.
This section presents the views and experiences of people who had been
engaged in some activity on a voluntary basis while claiming incapacity
benefits or National Insurance credits.  Not all these activities had been
reported to the Benefits Agency.
Across the group as a whole, there were many examples of involvement
in activities that the Benefits Agency might have considered could be
categorised as ‘voluntary work’ for which permission should be sought.
People explained that they had been active workers in residents’
associations, community support groups, advocacy and self-help groups;
had helped at local youth clubs or schools; used their vehicles to drive
disabled or elderly people; or taken part in performance arts.  People
welcomed such opportunities for companionship, filling their time and
getting out of the house, sometimes maintaining skills or gaining new
ones.
Those who had told the Benefits Agency about their activities included
people who were keen not to do anything that might get them into
trouble or jeopardise their benefits.  They had learned from previous
experiences, their friends or supporting agencies that it was sensible to let
the Benefits Agency know what they were doing, although not everybody
realised that they should have sought permission in advance.  Some had
been taking part in Work Preparation courses and Employment Service
staff had explained how to get in touch with the Benefits Agency.
4 Work Preparation is an individually tailored programme for disabled people, organised
by the Employment Service.  The aim is to assist people to overcome work-related
barriers in order to return to or join the labour market.  The average length of
participation is six weeks.  Work placement as part of Work Preparation is now
allowed under the approved work regulations introduced in April 2000, and thus no
longer categorised as voluntary work.
3.2  The approach taken
3.3  Views and experiences of
people who had done some
voluntary work
3.3.1  Activities undertaken
3.3.2  Seeking permission
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Those who had not been in touch with the Benefits Agency about their
activities had often just not thought of doing this.  They had not thought
that what they were doing constituted formal work, but talked about
their activity as ‘my hobby’, ‘just helping out’ or ‘doing them a favour’.  In the
minds of such people ‘voluntary work’ sometimes had more stereotyped
connotations, such as working in a charity shop or befriending/ counselling
needy people.  Some were surprised to learn from the researcher that
they might have been expected to seek permission for their own activities,
but when told expressed irritation and frustration about bureaucracy rather
than anxiety that they might have been doing wrong.
Several people remembered suggestions made to them about trying
activities on a voluntary basis, mentioning a range of professionals,
including GPs and consultants, staff in psychiatric services, Employment
Services staff, Personal Advisers, and supporting organisations.  In general,
staff who made such suggestions had explained that people should get in
touch with the Benefits Agency, and sometimes offered help with
applications.
There were examples of both reported and unreported voluntary activities
leading a person closer towards paid work, or directly into work.
Community activities had led to an invitation to apply for a full-time job
doing similar work.  Helping children to read at school had led to taking
paid part-time work at the school, as therapeutic work.  In most situations
where voluntary work had acted as a stepping stone in this way, there
was a good fit between the activity and the client’s aspirations of the kind
of paid work they might eventually do.  Where there was not this fit,
initiatives taken to try voluntary work as a purposeful step in the direction
of paid work were less successful.  Working in a charity shop for many
years was thought, in retrospect, to have held a person back and delayed
her development.
Voluntary work which had been arranged with an intermediary, for
example a Personal Adviser, had generally been helpful.  These included
work placements which were part of Work Preparation courses.  Other
examples included support from a mental health project to try office
work, which led to increased confidence, increase in hours and the hope
of making further progress towards paid work.  People who had sought
permission from the Benefits Agency had generally not met obstacles,
although there was some anxiety about possible repercussions in terms of
continued entitlement to benefit.
Those people who had been selected on the basis that they were recorded
as having done voluntary work fell into two groups.  One group of
people consisted of those who were trying a work environment, with a
view to moving towards paid work.  In this group, the activities had
been arranged with the help of a Personal Adviser, occupational therapist,
or staff providing Work Preparation courses.  All in this group said that
3.3.3  Perceived usefulness
3.3.4  ‘Users’ of voluntary work
provision
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the experience had been positive and useful; those who had not continued
moving towards paid work were people whose health had deteriorated.
In the other group of ‘users’ were people who did not remember reporting
an activity to the Benefits Agency while claiming incapacity benefits,
and one person who had applied for formal permission to spend time at
a ‘drop-in’ for company and a cup of tea, being anxious that activity of
any sort might jeopardise entitlement to benefits.  It seemed that her
letter, and the formal reply she received had been dealt with
administratively under the voluntary work provision.
People who said they had not done any activities on a voluntary basis,
either reported or unreported, knew in a general sense that benefit
claimants were allowed to do some kinds of voluntary work, although
many were hazy about any rules or processes that might be involved, or
had out-of-date information and expected the amount of work allowed
to be very limited.  Conceptualisation of voluntary work was often
stereotyped - charity shops were often mentioned.
When current rules were explained, and people were asked what would
influence their own consideration of undertaking voluntary work, they
said that this would depend on their health, and what opportunities arose
or were suggested.  It would be important to some to check the rules
carefully - concern remained about possible effect on benefits.  A further
concern was not wanting to let the employer down if their health
condition meant that they had to stop doing the work.  Some observed
that doing voluntary work could distract their search for paid opportunities,
or take up time that might be better spent on a training course.  Some
did not want to spend time working without pay.  There was a feeling
that having to report activities to the Benefits Agency would limit
spontaneous helping and participation in society, and it could be hard to
understand why there was a requirement to ask for permission if there
was no hours limit and no payment was received.
This section presents the views of staff in the three key agencies about
the role of voluntary work and the way in which the voluntary work
provision is used, and experiences of putting it into operation.
Benefits Agency staff in the pilot areas said that they were trained to
explain the rules about voluntary work, when asked.  If incapacity benefits
claimants expressed interest in doing voluntary work when talking to
front-line staff, staff would suggest they get in touch with local volunteer
bureaux; indeed, some staff might make preliminary telephone calls on
clients’ behalf, to arrange appointments or get a contact name.
3.4  Views of people who had
not done voluntary work
3.5  Putting the measure into
operation
3.5.1  Information dissemination
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Personal Advisers and Disability Employment Advisers said they responded
to interest, and clients’ own suggestions about doing voluntary work,
and might themselves suggest this way of working.  They stressed,
however, that they tried to present voluntary work as a means for further
progression, rather than as a way of life on incapacity benefits.
Disability Employment Advisers and Personal Advisers perceived voluntary
work as filling a number of roles:
• it could provide a means of improving confidence, social skills and
readiness for paid work
• it could provide a way of taking a first step into a work environment,
and was thought to be especially useful when a helping agency was
working alongside the client
• work opportunities available to clients were increased if employers
not offering paid jobs were willing to provide openings for voluntary
work
• it could be helpful in combination with other provision such as training,
for example in Work Preparation courses
• it fitted well with other forms of support for some disadvantaged people,
for example people recovering from severe mental health problems
and people with severe learning difficulties, who were receiving
intensive support in the community
Benefits Agency staff, generally, did not have such a wide view of the
various roles of voluntary work, as they were less familiar with the range
of arrangements and activities, but there was less unease and scepticism
about voluntary work than about therapeutic work.  Again, there was
some stereotyping of voluntary work, as work for charities, or volunteer
driving.
Benefits Agency staff said they had fewer applications for permission to
do voluntary work than from people who wanted to do therapeutic
work, and some felt that this might be because people expected to be
paid for any work they undertook.  Applications tended to be simpler
and quicker to deal with, since there was no medical input.  Applications
were carefully scrutinised by decision makers however, who had to decide
whether the amount and type of activity fitted the grounds for claiming
incapacity benefits.  Some surprise was expressed that there was no
requirement for a medical opinion; some clients doing voluntary work
appeared to be doing more energetic and demanding work than many
doing therapeutic work.
Staff perceived fewer problems arising in respect of voluntary work than
with therapeutic work.  Benefits Agency staff said that, as with therapeutic
work, clients tended to report work already started rather than seeking
permission first, but they were unlikely to take any further action about
such a situation.  It could be hard for clients to understand refusals of
3.5.2  Perceived role of voluntary
work
3.5.3  Implementation
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permission, since there was no money involved, but refusals were thought
to be relatively unusual.
Disability Employment Advisers and Personal Advisers regretted that there
were some clients who were unlikely to be able to use this measure, even
if it would be helpful, because of the kind of work they wanted to try.
Their experience was that there were very few opportunities for voluntary
work in sectors such as information technology, construction or
maintenance trades.  They also pointed out that work done in helping
clients access voluntary work often did not count in their own work-
related targets, and this constrained the amount of help they offered clients
who might benefit from doing some work on a voluntary basis.
There were relatively few participants in the New Deal for Disabled
People Personal Adviser Service evaluation research who had tried or
were actively engaged on voluntary work.  Among those who were
doing voluntary work when interviewed, jobs were as varied as those
described above in Section 3.3, for example working for a charity
organisation, helping in the office of a disability organisation, working in
a play scheme or local school, office and administrative work, reception
duties and helping in a supported employment scheme.  Most of these
examples of voluntary work are in organisations in the public or voluntary
sectors.  Not everybody expected their voluntary work to lead them
closer to paid work, but some who would have liked to find a paid
opportunity to do similar work thought this would be hard.
There was evidence from the interviews that some clients had not reported
their voluntary work to the Benefits Agency and among those who had
there was some resentment and confusion at the need to do this.
Again, working without pay was unacceptable to some people, and one
man felt that his partner would expect him to seek paid work, rather than
working in a voluntary capacity.
One additional finding came from follow-up interviews with clients
interviewed some six to twelve months earlier in the study.  Some people
who had been doing voluntary work at the time of the first interview
had either returned or were planning to return to the same voluntary
position after having made attempts to enter the paid labour market.
Paid work had proved too demanding, or job interviews had proved
difficult and distressing.  For these people, voluntary work had not been
the stepping stone to work they had expected.  They had learned that
moving to work was likely to take longer than at first thought, but had
not necessarily given up the idea.
3.6  Evidence from the New
Deal for Disabled People
Personal Adviser pilots
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Findings from clients and staff in the key agencies suggest that:
• there is a lack of clarity in the definition of voluntary work, for benefit
purposes
• participation by incapacity benefits claimants in activities which might
be considered voluntary work by the Benefits Agency may be fairly
widespread, but not all such activities are reported
• there are likely to be significant problems in ensuring that relevant
activities are reported to the Benefits Agency, because of stereotyped
conceptions of voluntary work, and the fact that the work is unpaid.
R aising levels of understanding and changing people’s beliefs and
attitudes may be hard, and too heavy a focus might be counter-
productive in terms of reducing spontaneous helping and participation
in society
• being able to do some work on an unpaid basis while still claiming
incapacity benefits does help some people move towards paid work,
and can contribute to eventual moves off benefit
• there are currently inequities in access to the use of the voluntary
work provision, as opportunities to do unpaid work are not evenly
spread across all sectors of industry and all types of work
• not everybody who might consider the measure is prepared to work
for no pay, but among people who might do voluntary work there is
some lack of awareness of the opportunity, and some stereotyping of
voluntary work which may limit identification of opportunities
• there may be some loss of opportunity for incapacity benefits claimants
to get active help in arranging to do unpaid work, because Disability
Employment Advisers and Personal Advisers perceive no direct
outcomes in terms of their own performance targets
• perceived and actual associations between doing unpaid work and being
asked to take a Personal Capability Assessment are likely to deter some
people who might otherwise consider doing voluntary work
3.7  Issues for policy
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The incapacity earnings provision was one of the four pilot work incentive
measures introduced in April 1999, providing another way of enabling
some people to do some paid work while retaining benefits on the grounds
of incapacity.  The measure allowed people to earn up to £ 15 a week
(net of income tax, National Insurance contributions and one half of
contributions to an occupational or personal pension scheme, work
expenses, and up to £ 60 per week of permitted child care charges).  The
maximum number of hours allowed was not specified, but the national
minimum wage provided an indicator to Benefits Agency staff making
decisions.
Incapacity earnings provision enabled people to undertake some work
without the need for medical recommendation, and to gain financially
from that work.  The measure went some way to providing opportunities
for some people who did not want to work on an unpaid basis, and some
people for whom the therapeutic work rules were not helpful.
The introduction of both incapacity earnings provision and Work Trial
for incapacity benefits claimants required regulation changes in order to
conduct the pilot.  The regulations were written in such a way that the
areas affected by the regulation changes were specified by postal code
within each pilot area (OSD Benefit Support, 1999).
The pilot work incentives were managed by an Inter-Departmental project
team, who explained the policy background and discussed arrangements
for promoting the measures with staff in the key agencies in the 15 pilot
areas.  Practical arrangements for promotion and advertising differed in
each area, depending on resources and opportunities.  Staff within the
Benefits Agency were asked to make as many claimants aware of the
incentives as possible, but in no way to exert pressure.
This was a new measure for incapacity benefits claimants. As explained
in Chapter 2, there was evidence that some people who would have
liked to do some paid work were unable to do therapeutic work because
the medical requirement did not fit well with their condition.  The
incapacity earnings provision had some similarities with the ‘disregard’
arrangements in Income Support.  Among Income Support claimants,
generally, knowledge of the earnings disregard rules has been limited
(Shaw et al., 1996) and there is some evidence that among lone mothers
and unemployed people claiming Income Support, earnings disregards
were sometimes perceived to act as a disincentive to part-time work
(Thomas et al., 1999).
INCAPACITY EARNINGS PROVISION4
4.1  Introduction
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It was considered important, in piloting this measure, that administrative
requirements were kept to a minimum, in order for this new rule to be
seen as an encouragement.  It was intended that notifications from
claimants that they were using the incapacity earnings provision should
be dealt with by raters, and there was no requirement for verification of
earnings.  Staff were advised that the date on which the All Work Test
was due to take place should not be brought forward as a result of claimants’
participation in incapacity earnings provision.
The approach taken was similar to that described in previous chapters.
Those clients selected on the basis that they were recorded as having
used the measure were asked about their experiences and views, and
what impact there had been on any moves towards work.  Knowledge
about the measure was explored among all other clients, and views sought.
Staff in all agencies were asked about their experience in advising clients
about the measure and the way it was put into operation.
None of those people who had been selected as having used incapacity
earnings provision recognised that they had used this measure; nor did
any recognise properly the name of the measure.  The researcher was
sometimes, but not always, able to interpret the circumstances described
in ways that might have fitted use of this measure.  For example, one
person described having done a little work for a friend, and receiving
£ 15 a week for a few weeks until he decided that the work did not suit
him.  When interviewed, this person was currently doing some voluntary
work, but was not expecting to try paid work again in the foreseeable
future.  Other situations described suggested that some people had applied
to the Benefits Agency for permission to do therapeutic work after starting
a job, and while the application for therapeutic work was being processed
they were allowed to keep £ 15 of earnings, using the incapacity earnings
provision.  Those who were still doing therapeutic work when interviewed
found this helpful and wanted to keep their jobs.  They thought their
poor health would make it hard to take more substantial work.
Deterioration in health was the reason why one client had stopped working
already.
None of those who were recorded as having used incapacity earning
provision described having received support from a Disability Employment
Adviser or Personal Adviser in getting their work.  Findings suggest that
in this small group of people, use of the incapacity earnings provision
was more to do with the use of the measure by Benefits Agency staff in
order to be helpful to clients than with understanding and purposeful
notification of use of the measure by clients.
There was little recognition of the name of this measure; only one person
remembered a Personal Adviser mentioning it.  After explanation by the
researcher, some people said they had heard of something like that, but it
was clear that many were confusing the measure with the Income Support
disregard.
4.1.3  Administrative procedures
4.2  The approach taken
4.3  Views and experiences of
clients recorded as having used
incapacity earnings provision
4.4  Views of people not
recorded as having used
incapacity earnings provision
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Those who did grasp some of the basic rules during discussion with the
researcher saw possible advantages in that the measure offered one more
option for people who wanted to try work.  A perceived lack of
bureaucracy was welcome.  However, several disadvantages were
perceived:
• the earnings limit meant that the amount of work allowed would be
too small to test a job
• the earnings limit would not allow the client to be responsive to an
employer’s request for even one hour’s extra work
• lack of involvement of the GP might encourage some people to
undertake harmful work
• there was a possibility of rent increases as a result of interaction with
housing benefit
• some people might get stuck in low level, poorly paid situations which
did not help them progress
• some people were likely to be no better off financially if they had
heavy work expenses, or the working arrangement was long-term
Confusions with the Income Support disregard remained, and people
who had experience of working in that way described negative experiences
such as frequent queries, recall of order books for adjustment, and feelings
that Benefits Agency staff were suspicious of their activities.
Those who tried to compare incapacity earnings provision with therapeutic
work generally came down in favour of therapeutic work, because there
seemed greater clarity in this arrangement and people could earn more
money.  Jobs available seemed to fit therapeutic work better, in terms of
earnings limits.  The high child care allowance in incapacity earnings
provision interested some women.  However, it was hard to understand
why such high levels of child care might be involved for work with such
low earnings and people could not relate such arrangements to their own
experience.
Awareness and understanding of incapacity earnings provision among
staff was variable, and staff generally had little to say about this measure in
the interviews and discussions.  Benefits Agency staff recognised the name,
and remembered some discussion in their office at the time it was
introduced.  Few could remember having dealt with claimants using
incapacity earnings provision, and most said they would have to check
the rules to remind themselves about how it should be implemented.
There was a general feeling that very few clients enquired about this
measure.
There had been some promotion of incapacity earnings provision by
Personal Advisers, and some Disability Employment Advisers, but some
disappointment was expressed about lack of momentum in inter-agency
working to advertise and promote the four pilot measures generally, at a
local level, once they had been launched.
4.5  Putting the measure into
operation
4.5.1  Information dissemination
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Those Personal Advisers and Disability Employment Advisers who had
some experience of advising clients about this measure said that they had
sometimes suggested its use as a step towards therapeutic work, which
took longer to arrange.
O ther advantages perceived by Personal Advisers and Disability
Employment Advisers were that the measure was:
• easy to implement, without GP involvement
• quick to set up and thus responsive to opportunities that arose
• a way of maintaining momentum in moves towards work
Some disadvantages perceived were that the measure was only appropriate
for small-scale jobs and might trigger an All Work Test.  (As explained in
Section 4.2, use of the measure should not have affected the timing of an
All Work Test.)
Those Benefits Agency staff who believed that their office had dealt with
claimants using this measure worked in an area which had an Employment
Service Personal Adviser Service pilot project.  Their recollection was
that there had been applications for therapeutic work which had been
dealt with initially under the incapacity earnings provision.
Otherwise, nobody had clear recollection of implementation.  Staff did
recall some discussion at the beginning of the pilot period as to how the
permitted earnings would be dealt with for purposes of Housing Benefit,
and what happened if clients were also claiming Income Support which
has a lower disregard level (£ 5) for some claimants, but staff could not
remember the outcome of these discussions.  Benefits Agency staff found
it hard to believe that this measure could act as an incentive as the limit
on earnings was so low.
Very few Personal Adviser Service clients had heard of the incapacity
earnings provision and it appears that only one had actually made use of
the measure.  When asked in interviews what they had discussed with
their Personal Advisers regarding the effects on their benefits of working
only one person referred to incapacity earnings provision.
There was a general feeling among the Personal Advisers and pilot
managers interviewed that the measure was rarely suited either to the
aspirations of their clients, many of whom were looking towards full-
time work or at least making significant strides towards working, or to
their own ways of moving clients along.  They had other, more suitable,
provisions available to them through, for example, therapeutic work,
Work Trial or training allowances.
None of the pilots reported anything more than very occasional use of
the incapacity earnings provision.
4.5.2  Perceived role of incapacity
earnings provision
4.5.3  Implementation
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Findings from this study suggest:
• levels of awareness and understanding of incapacity earnings provision
among incapacity benefits claimants in the pilot areas was low
• staff of the Personal Adviser Service pilots saw only very limited value
in the incapacity earnings provision in moving clients towards work
• there was limited impact of any advertising or promotion of incapacity
earnings provision and the measure was little used
• when it was used, this was often as a first step in accessing therapeutic
work. Advisers sometimes suggested this role to their clients.  Benefits
Agency staff who wanted to be helpful to clients sometimes saw
incapacity earnings provision as a positive way of dealing initially with
applications for therapeutic work made after starting work, without
seeming to be obstructive
• as a first step towards therapeutic work, the measure had been useful
• there was little evidence in this study of incapacity benefit claimants
actively opting for incapacity earnings provision, although some
Personal Advisers thought that there had been a few examples
The Department’s own management information statistics showed that
take-up of incapacity earnings provision had remained low throughout
the pilot period, and no new claims for incapacity earnings provision
were allowed after 7 April, 2000.
4.7  Issues for policy
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Work Trial is an Employment Service programme which was extended
to include incapacity benefits claimants and supported with changes in
the benefit regulations, and was another of the four pilot work incentive
measures introduced for this client group in 15 areas in April 1999.
The programme allows a person to fill an actual vacancy for up to 15
working days.  This gives a potential employer an opportunity to assess
whether the person can do the job, and enables the person concerned to
make an informed decision about whether the job is suitable for them.
The person doing the work remains on benefit during the trial, and
receives no payment, although daily meal expenses of up to £ 1.50 and
travel expenses of up to £ 10 per day may be paid.  The job tried should
be at least 16 hours per week and should be a job which would last at
least six months.  The person working may leave the placement at any
stage.
Entry to Work Trial is a matter for the Employment Service, which
notifies the local Benefits Agency about participants so that they are
recorded as permitted to work.  In the Personal Adviser Service pilot
areas, participants may be routed to the programme by the Personal
Advisers.
The interim evaluation of the New Deal for Disabled People Personal
Adviser service pilot projects (Arthur et al., 1999) showed that incapacity
benefits claimants surveyed identified a number of bridges which could
be helpful in preparing them for work.  Those considered important by
people taking part in the New Deal for Disabled People included knowing
about the job before beginning and training to get ready for work (Table
3.27).  Knowing that they would be able to continue on the previous
benefit if the job did not work out was also very important (Table 3.28).
Work Trial goes some way to meeting some of these requirements.
Evaluation of Work Trial as used by other client groups has found that
the measure is effective in helping unemployed people into work (CEI,
1990).  Employees recruited via Work Trial valued the opportunity to
try out a job in a work environment.  For employers, Work Trial widened
the pool of potential applicants for jobs, and helped to improve their
selection process (Atkinson et al., 1997).
Administrative procedures are a matter for the Employment Service.
Briefly, the work environment must be monitored for health and safety
before a claimant is placed, and then at intervals according to discretion.
There are requirements on employers to have insurance which will cover
WORK TRIAL5
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the participant, and to have undertaken risk assessment.  There must be
a formal work agreement before the participant starts work, and the
employer receives a briefing which includes some personal information
about the participant.  The participant’s progress is monitored by visiting
the work premises at least once during the trial period.  The participant’s
work expenses are normally paid by the employer who is reimbursed by
the local Employment Service office.  If the participant is offered the job
at the end of the Work Trial, this counts as a ‘placing’ for staff monitoring
purposes in the Employment Service.
The approach taken was similar to that described in previous chapters.
Clients selected on the basis that they were recorded as having used
Work Trial were asked about their experiences and views, and what
impact there had been on any moves towards work.  Knowledge about
the measure was explored among all clients, and views sought.  There
was little to discuss with Benefits Agency staff about this measure, since
they have a limited role.  Employment Service staff and Personal Advisers
have a key role in promoting this measure and enabling access, and they
were asked about their experience in advising clients, putting the measure
into operation, and their views on how useful this measure had been.
Those who had been selected on the basis of having used Work Trial
recognised the name of the measure and discussed their experiences.
All had been in touch with a Personal Adviser or Disability Employment
Adviser, found a job in which they were interested and started discussing
the job with the employer and their adviser.  In one local area the clients
felt they had little choice in the matter of whether they used Work Trial;
it was explained to them more as a probationary period, as part of the
particular employer’s requirements.  At the time these people would
have been prepared to take the jobs anyway as they were keen to be in
work.  However, the possibility of trying the job before committing
themselves was welcome to people who were concerned that materials
used in the workplace might affect health, and people who had been out
of work for a long time, and they were pleased when their adviser suggested
this.
Not everybody who had used Work Trial recognised it as a way of
trying work.  One person had already accepted a full-time post but was
anxious about managing the household budget while waiting for the first
salary cheque.  Exploring all options on her behalf, a Personal Adviser
realised that doing a Work Trial in the job would extend her period on
Income Support long enough to secure the lone parent Income Support
and Housing Benefit extensions, and the client thought this was very
helpful.
5.2  The approach taken
5.3  Views and experiences of
clients recorded as having used
Work Trial
5.3.1  Perceived role of Work Trial
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The financial implications of working while claiming benefits had different
significance, according to personal circumstances.  A man with a family,
with pressing financial problems, would have preferred to have been
paid immediately for his full-time work, so felt frustrated that there seemed
little choice about doing a Work Trial.  On the other hand, for a person
with substantial private resources, the fact that she would be working
initially for a benefit income and then be paid below the minimum wage
level was not that significant.  For the parent who wanted the out-of-
work benefit extensions, it was essential that she stayed on benefits for
another two weeks.
No problems were recalled about setting up the arrangements, but the
payment of expenses did not always go smoothly.
Those who agreed they had done a Work Trial had all continued in their
jobs at the end of the trial and moved off incapacity benefits.  People
whose health broke down again, those whose pain increased, and those
who found the work too hard left their jobs in the following three months,
and one employer ended the job after six months.  At the time of the
interview there was a mix between people back on incapacity benefits
and looking for other opportunities, and those in full-time work, or
work-related activities such as re-training as a result of the experience on
Work Trial.  There was general agreement, in retrospect, that there had
been long-term advantages for those who had done a Work Trial.
The advantage to the employer of having work done without having to
pay for it was also stressed, however, and one employer was described as
exploiting Work Trial and the New Deal provisions generally.
The group also included a well-qualified person who was currently trying
to get a job with a Work Trial but was finding it hard to find an employer
who would agree to this.  He commented that Disability Employment
Advisers had poor links across geographical areas, either to companies
and employers or to other Disability Employment Advisers.
Most of the people in the study group appeared to hear about Work
Trial for the first time from the researcher.  Among those who offered
opinions there were mixed views.  Some felt they were currently so far
from work that it was hard to think about Work Trial in relation to
themselves.  People who felt there was a possibility of their doing paid
work again and were closer to the labour market saw advantages in being
able to try out a job in the work environment, to see how they managed
and whether they liked the job, especially if there was a real job at the
end.  Such people did not mind the idea of extending their period on
benefit for such purposes, although it would be important not to be any
worse off financially while trying the job.
5.3.2  Making the arrangements
5.3.3  Perceived usefulness
5.4  Views of people who had
not used Work Trial
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A number of disadvantages were identified.  People with fluctuating
conditions thought that 15 days would not be long enough to see whether
they could manage.  Some people thought that the employer would get
to know more about their illness than they wanted to share, a view
expressed particularly by people with mental health problems.  Others
found the idea of employers getting free labour exploitative and
unacceptable.  Not everybody believed that the Benefits Agency would
honour the arrangement, and there was a suggestion that the staff made
empty promises to pressure people into work.
In the pilot areas not all Employment Service front-line staff knew of the
availability of Work Trial to incapacity benefits claimants.  However the
Disability Employment Advisers and Personal Advisers all understood
the availability of Work Trial to their clients, and expected to respond to
any enquiries with full information, suggest it to clients when it seemed
appropriate, and offer help with making arrangements as far as possible.
Arrangements differed in local areas.  In Personal Adviser Services with
staff seconded from the Employment Service access to Work Trial could
be arranged directly.  Otherwise, Personal Advisers referred clients to
points of access in the Jobcentres.
As with incapacity earnings provision, there was some disappointment
among Disability Employment Advisers that local initiatives to advertise
and promote the measure, and build up contacts with local Benefits Agency
staff, seemed to have run out of steam during the pilot period.
All Benefits Agency staff had heard of Work Trial, but direct experience
was generally limited to making computerised records that incapacity
benefits claimants were undertaking a Work Trial, when notified by the
Employment Service.  If their clients enquired about a Work Trial, they
expected to refer them to the Employment Service.  One observation
was that some local employers were believed to exploit Work Trial
arrangements - this comment was made by Benefits Agency staff working
in the same area as the client referred to in Section 5.3.3 who felt she had
experienced exploitation.
Experience of helping incapacity claimants to use Work Trial was limited
among the Personal Advisers and Disability Employment Advisers taking
part, and there were mixed views.  Positive views included the following:
• Work Trials offered another opportunity to some people in moving
towards work, especially people who had not been away from work
for too long or were going into work they had not tried before
• the security of remaining on benefits during the Work Trial was seen
as welcome
• the encouragement of the in-work visit by the monitoring adviser
could be helpful
5.5  Putting the measure into
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However, there were some disadvantages:
• the measure seemed bureaucratic and took a long time to set up,
especially if the employer had not taken anybody on Work Trial before,
and an assessment on employer’s premises was necessary
• the bureaucracy and delay that could be involved in recouping work
expenses could be a further problem for clients, especially if employers
were not prepared to pay these directly
• working for no financial reward, especially if incurring high expenditure
that was not quickly recouped was unattractive to some clients, and
the measure was often not perceived to offer much incentive
• employers expected that people offered a Work Trial would be able to
do the job, and it was important not to disappoint them, in order to
maintain their participation in the programme.  The advisers’ experience
was that incapacity benefits claimants often needed a period of retraining
or work preparation, and Work Trials were appropriate to relatively
few, so far
Some Advisers felt that, on balance, Work Preparation (see Footnote 4)
was a more useful programme than Work Trial for a greater proportion
of their clients claiming incapacity benefits.  Work Preparation was easier
and quicker to set up, and allowed a longer trial period with more
supportive input from the provider service.
In interviews with clients who had been through some form of trying
out work before deciding whether to take up a permanent paid post
there was a lack of clarity about exactly which benefit or employment
provisions they had been using at the time.  R eferences were made to
placements, work experience and to trials.  One client did describe moving
into a job after a three week trial but it was unclear whether this was a
formal Work Trial or a coincidence of timing.
Staff of the Personal Adviser Service pilots were generally positive about
the potential value to some clients who were not quite ready to take on
a job, but they had used Work Trials only rarely for a number of reasons.
Some of these have been noted above, such as the time taken to set up
the arrangement via the Employment Service.  Additionally there was a
feeling that other provisions were often better suited to their clients’
needs, especially if a trial period of, say, one day a week for an extended
period was required.
Findings from clients and staff in key agencies suggest that:
• Work Trial can be an incentive to some incapacity benefits claimants
to try work, offering a relatively risk-free opportunity to try out work
• Work Trials can lead to people moving off incapacity benefits, or
other outcomes perceived as helpful such as retraining
• jobs achieved at the end of Work Trial may not last very long, especially
if health deteriorates
5.6  Evidence from the New
Deal for Disabled People
Personal Adviser pilots
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• some employers may be exploiting Work Trial arrangements
• staff who might promote the use of Work Trial to incapacity benefit
claimants can be discouraged by perceptions that access is bureaucratic
and lengthy
• clients who find it unacceptable to work without wages, and those
who do not want employers to know about their health or impairment
are unlikely to respond to Work Trial as an incentive
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Jobfinder’s Grant is an Employment Service provision which was extended
to people moving off incapacity benefits in April 1999 during the pilot
period.  This measure made available a one-off payment of £ 200 to
people who started work in a lower-paid job.  The payment might be
used as people wished, but was designed to offset some of the initial
expenses that people may face when they take a job, such as buying
suitable clothes or meeting living costs while waiting for first wages.  The
availability of Jobfinders’s Grant might, it was hoped, help to encourage
disabled people or people with a long-term health problem to consider a
wider range of jobs than otherwise.  Such people might then take work
in which they could boost earnings with Jobmatch or Disabled Person’s
Tax Credit, measures which are described in later chapters.
The grant was available to people who had been incapable of work for at
least 28 weeks, who moved from incapacity benefits into a job of at least
16 hours weekly, which was expected to last six months and paid £ 200
gross weekly or less.  The person must have had less than £ 2,800 in
savings.
People who are interested in a move off incapacity benefits often view
the transition period as potentially risky (Arthur et al., 1999).  It can be
hard to pay rent or mortgage and other normal household expenses
without benefits while waiting for first wages or pay cheques.  People
without savings or other significant sources of income may see no
alternative to borrowing to tide them over, and there is a fear of debt and
its consequences.  These problems of transition from out-of-work income
to earnings, especially for people whose earnings are low, also affect non-
disabled unemployed people (Shaw et al., 1996).  They are thus well-
known, and people claiming incapacity benefits may already have previous
experience of these difficulties or have in their households other people
who have had similar problems.
In addition to worrying about how they will pay ordinary household
expenses while they are waiting for wages, people may have new work-
related expenses.  The cost of fares and clothes to work are often higher
for disabled than for non-disabled people (Berthoud et al., 1993).  Among
early participants in the New Deal for Disabled People who were surveyed
in 1999, 43 per cent said that having suitable clothes for work would
help them move from benefits into work (Arthur et al., 1999, Table
3.27).  Jobfinder’s Grant might go some way to providing the financial
resources which would help.
JOBFINDER’S GRANT6
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The grant was initially piloted with long-term unemployed people in
1994 (Moore and Dickinson, 1995) and launched nationally in 1995
(Balchin, 1996).  A study based on administrative statistics of some 29,000
Jobfinder’s Grants awarded during 1995-97 to people who had been
long-term unemployed, with a follow-up survey of a sample of clients,
showed a relatively high level of deadweight in the grant acting as an
incentive to take low-paid work (Dickinson and Broome, 1998).  The
grant seemed to have most effect where the financial decision was tight.
However, there was evidence that the grant did smooth the transition
back into work, and encouraged people to stay in work. Gardiner (1997)
has reviewed 42 different ‘welfare to work’ measures.  There were nine
schemes where there was sufficient data to allow comparison on three
measures of effectiveness: value for money, additionality and take-up.
On these measures, Gardiner identified the Jobfinder’s Grant and Jobmatch
as the most successful.  However, Beyer et al. (2000) suggest that in the
context of movement off incapacity benefits, the potential effectiveness
of such measures may be rather different from their impact in the context
of easing transitions from unemployment.
The intention was that people interested in work were made aware of
the availability of the grant in advance of taking a job, perhaps at the
stage when they were thinking of starting to look for work, and thinking
through the financial implications.  Personal Advisers and Disability
Employment Advisers were encouraged to explain the amount of money
available, and how it might be useful.  Some Personal Adviser Service
pilot projects incorporated the availability of Jobfinder’s Grant and
Jobmatch in their own local advertisements and promotion of the New
Deal for Disabled People.
There were standard application forms, seeking information about the
client’s personal circumstances and the job offer.  The first page of the
form had to be completed by the Adviser (local Employment Service
staff or Personal Advisers) and constituted a certificate of eligibility for
the grant.  Completed forms were dealt with by Employment Service
Payment Offices, and grants were paid by giro through a post office.
Completed forms had to be received by Payment Offices within 14
calendar days of starting work.  Entitlement to the grant was not automatic,
and some discretionary decisions were made by staff in Payment Offices.
Clients who had been selected to take part in this study on the basis that
they were recorded as having received a Jobfinder’s Grant were asked
about their views and experiences, and what impact this measure had in
influencing their decisions about taking a job.  General awareness and
understanding of the measure was explored among all clients, and those
who had not yet used Jobfinder’s Grant were asked whether they believed
such a grant might be useful to them in the future.  Disability Employment
Advisers and Personal Advisers were asked about their experiences in
6.1.3  Administrative procedures
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promoting and implementing the measure, and their views on its usefulness
as an incentive to take a job.
In this study group all who had applied for a grant, who included some
selected because they had used another measure, had already decided on
a job before Jobfinder’s Grant was discussed with the Personal Adviser or
Disability Employment Adviser, and most already had a start date. Advisers
told such clients about the grant as they talked about financial aspects of
moving into work.  One client who had heard about the grant from a
friend waited for the Personal Adviser to mention this, but when this did
not happen, raised it himself.  Those who had found a job were anxious
about the transitional period while they waited for their first earnings,
and some were also seeking practical help with applications for tax credits
at this stage.
People who had applied for grants generally said they were going to take
the jobs anyway, and the availability of Jobfinder’s Grant was not a strong
influence on their decisions.  Some pointed out that they did not know
if their applications were going to be successful, so it would not have
been wise to base decisions on expectation of receiving the extra money.
To people in this study group, the grants seemed more like a reward for
initiative, or a help along the way.
There were generally no problems with the initial application. Waiting
times varied, and one application was delayed because the wrong wage
rate had been reported initially.
One application had failed, but the client did not understand why and
did not pursue the matter.  This client was recorded as having received a
Jobfinder’s Grant, but he was certain his application had been refused
and concerned to hear that he was recorded as having received money.
Those who had been hoping to use the grant for work clothes or basic
living expenses during the transition period were disappointed to have to
wait for several weeks, and said that this experience would be a disincentive
for any future occasions.
In retrospect, everybody who had received a grant said it had been helpful.
There was a boost to income, and for some, a boost to confidence and
lowering of anxiety.  In general, the money went towards household
expenses, fares to work and clothes.  As explained, the money usually
arrived after earnings had started coming in, so some people used it to
buy clothes for their children, and one person bought work-related books.
Another person who had been surprised to receive such a large amount
lent most of it to a friend.
Knowing that the grant might have to be paid back if they left the job
after a short time had been a worry for some, however.
6.3  Users’ views and
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Apart from those who had received or applied for a grant, few people
had heard of this measure, and those who thought they might have heard
of it had hazy knowledge.
When the researcher explained the basic rules and procedures most people
who offered views said that the availability of Jobfinder’s Grant was unlikely
to be a key influence on any decisions they might make about working.
What would be more important was the suitability of the job and their
health.  However, a £ 200 grant would certainly be a help in the transition
period if they did move off incapacity benefits, going towards household
expenses, clothes, bus fares, tools or equipment, or preventing the need
to borrow.  Views varied on the amount of the grant.  Those who thought
the amount should be higher if it was really going to help towards clothes
or tools for work were generally people who had previous experience of
higher paid work.  Some people said they would be quite wary, and
would need to be certain of all the rules before applying for the grant.
The possibility of having to pay it back was identified as a disadvantage,
which would worry people and reduce the attraction of the measure.  It
was considered important that if the grant was advertised the savings
limit should be made clear, or false hopes might be raised.
There was some evidence that Jobfinder’s Grant was sometimes being
promoted in ways which policy makers had not intended.  One person
showed the researcher an application form already authorised and signed
by an Adviser, which he was keeping in case he got an interview for a
job.  He believed he could send in the form if he got an interview, in
order to receive money for a suit to wear, and did not realise that getting
the grant depended on having a job.
All front-line staff in the Employment Service and Benefits Agency had
heard of Jobfinder’s Grant, but not all knew that it was available to people
in their area claiming incapacity benefits.
Front-line Employment Service staff said that the measure was fairly well-
known among other client groups seeking work.  Disability Employment
Advisers and Personal Advisers expected to provide information and advice
about the measure, to include it in discussions about moving towards
work, and give practical help with applications where appropriate.
In areas which had a Personal Adviser Service pilot project, Personal
Advisers had direct experience of advising clients about this measure.
Advisers in the Employment Service Personal Adviser Service pilots could
issue the application pack themselves, were familiar with procedures and
had not met many problems.  At the time of the research interviews,
Advisers in the Contract-led Personal Adviser Service pilots (see Section
1.4.1) had to refer clients to the local Jobcentre to obtain the grant and
were less familiar with rules and procedures.  Disability Employment
Advisers understood the procedures, but not all had experience of helping
clients on incapacity benefits to access the grant.
6.4  Views of people who had
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There were differences of opinion about how well the grant worked as
an incentive. Personal Advisers and Disability Employment Advisers agreed
that clients were very interested in the grant.  Some felt that the availability
of the grant could be a strong influence, and they believed that it did
provide an incentive by reducing some of the financial risks and insecurities
associated with moving off incapacity benefits.
However, it sometimes did not work out as clients expected.  Personal
Advisers in the Contract-led Personal Adviser Service areas said that the
time limits were tight for the people they advised, in view of the need for
clients to apply separately to the Employment Service.  Several applications
made by clients they had advised had been refused, for various reasons,
including spent time limits and clients’ levels of savings.  Those grants
which were awarded often took up to six weeks to arrive, which led to
complaints from clients and reports of financial problems.  As a result of
these experiences, some Advisers had lost confidence in the measure and
some felt uneasy that they had been promoting an incentive which was
not delivered.  Some thought they had become ‘very careful’ about
promoting the measure, and tended to tell clients that getting Jobfinder’s
Grant to help a move to work was not always easy.
Complaints about delays in receipt of Jobfinder’s Grant and refusals of
applications were sometimes received by staff in the Benefits Agency,
who felt that the delivery time and the savings limit for this measure
should be better advertised.
Many of the clients in the Personal Adviser Service research who were in
work had learned of the Jobfinder’s Grant through their Personal Adviser.
Some had successfully applied for the grant.  Several had been refused,
however, either because their job would not last six months, their pay
was too high or because their savings exceeded the permitted limit.
There was evidence in the accounts of the clients interviewed and of the
Personal Adviser Service staff that the Jobfinder’s Grant was being treated
differently from its original purpose of encouraging people to take jobs
they would not otherwise have considered, as a result of costs of going
into work.  As well as being used as a means of overcoming people’s
barriers to work in this way, it was also being marketed and used more as
a direct financial inducement to take work, like a reward.  Some pilots
mentioned the availability of the £ 200 grant in their advertising and
publicity material.
There were also examples of Personal Advisers using their Interventions
Fund in a number of ways linked to Jobfinder’s Grant.  (The Interventions
Fund is a ring-fenced amount of money allocated to Personal Adviser
pilots to use on a discretionary basis to provide financial assistance to
clients moving towards or into work.)  The most common examples
were using the fund to offer clients loans of £ 200 until their application
6.5.2  Perceived role of Jobfinder’s
Grant
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for Jobfinder’s Grant had been processed, and giving clients whose
application had failed the same amount as the grant.  Loans were expected
to be paid back when the Jobfinder’s Grant eventually came through.
The use of the fund in this way was justified because it overcame the
problem for clients of waiting for money which was needed earlier.
Payments to clients refused by the Employment Service were justified
on the grounds that some people in need of assistance were excluded
from Jobfinder’s Grant by eligibility criteria such as savings limits.
Several clients referred to receiving money they hadn’t expected, one
mentioned being given ‘£ 200 cash’ which was ‘a surprise’.
As noted above, the Jobfinder’s Grant did not seem to work mainly as an
incentive to take paid work and come off benefit.  It was welcomed by
recipients, most of whom acknowledged its usefulness.
By the time most of the fieldwork for the research had  been completed
it was announced by the Secretary of State for Social Security that
Jobfinder’s Grant would be replaced in 2001.  From April 2001 a job
grant of £ 100 will be available to a range of clients, including people
moving off incapacity benefits.
Although Jobfinder’s Grant as such will not continue, there are several
issues for consideration by policy makers that have emerged from the
research:
• the study confirms that some people receive Jobfinder’s Grant who
would have taken their jobs anyway, and thus the measure did not
always act as an incentive
• in terms of reducing financial risks during the transition from incapacity
benefits to earnings, late delivery of the grant reduced its effectiveness
• initially, there were operational difficulties in some local areas which
acted to clients’ disadvantage in accessing the measure, and some
Personal Advisers lost confidence in promoting Jobfinder’s Grant and
advising clients
• the measure was not always promoted appropriately by staff
• although it sometimes did not work in the way intended by policy, a
lump-sum grant after moving off incapacity benefits into work was
welcome, and did ease some household budgets
6.7  Issues for policy
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Jobmatch was the fourth measure piloted from April 1999 in 15 areas.
Jobmatch aimed to encourage people to gain work experience with one
or more part-time jobs (if a full-time job was inappropriate or not
available).  It provided an extra weekly allowance of £ 50 on top of
wages, for people who had been incapable of work for at least 28 weeks
and moved off incapacity benefits into a job of less than 30 hours per
week, for an employer other than the one they last worked for.  Jobmatch
was paid for up to 26 weeks as long as the person remained in work.  The
payments counted as gross income for Working Families’ Tax Credit
and Disabled Person’s Tax Credit, Housing Benefit and Council Tax
Benefit, but were not assessable for purposes of National Insurance
contributions or income tax.
Jobmatch was originally intended for people who took up unsubsidised
part-time jobs of between 16 and 30 hours, or more than one small part-
time job, although they might have preferred a full-time job.  The original
intention was that the measure would not be marketed, but would be
part of an Adviser’s ‘tool kit’; not an entitlement but an additional payment
which would be offered at the discretion of the Adviser to people who
would not ordinarily consider part-time work.  It was used with some
flexibility in some local areas for disabled people who wanted to limit
their hours of work (CPAG, 1999).
A survey of early participants in the New Deal for Disabled People Personal
Adviser Service pilot projects showed that more than half of those who
wanted to do paid work would have liked a full-time job (Arthur et al.,
1999, Table 3.20).  However, barriers to work perceived included
problems in finding the kind of work that would suit, and the lack of
suitable local job opportunities (Table 3.25).  More than 40 per cent of
participants worried that they would be worse off financially if they started
work.  Jobmatch might go some way to removing some of these barriers,
enabling some people to find suitable job opportunities which they could
afford to take.
Tax credits are also available to boost low earnings of people working
over 16 hours, and tax credits can be renewed at the end of the six
month payment period.  However, the tax credits are based on household
income and savings, and there are particular eligibility criteria in terms of
receipt of qualifying benefits, which rule out of eligibility some incapacity
benefits claimants who move into work, for example people receiving
Income Support without a disability premium.  Some of those people
might see Jobmatch as a way to raise overall income level, although
Jobmatch is not available to self-employed people.
JOBMATCH7
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As explained in the previous chapter, Jobmatch has been available to
other client groups over a longer period.  A number of evaluative studies
were conducted on Jobmatch pilot schemes (SIA, 1995; Loyd and Hussey,
1996; Clemens, 1997).  Findings were that Jobmatch, as available to
long-term unemployed people, was a popular scheme which could act as
an incentive to some unemployed people to take part-time work, and
could be a stepping stone towards full-time work.  Early qualitative work
(SIA, 1995) showed that for some participants, a fear of what would
happen at the end of the Jobmatch period was important.  However,
follow-up survey research (Clemens, 1997) showed that the majority of
participants were still in work 12 months after starting Jobmatch, and 30
per cent had increased their hours to 30 or more per week.  Jobmatch
was included in Gardiner’s review (1997) of 42 different welfare-to-
work measures.  Among nine of these schemes for which there was
sufficient information to enable comparison on value for money,
additionality and take-up, Jobmatch and Jobfinder’s Grant were identified
as the most successful.
Jobmatch was offered at the discretion of Personal Advisers or Employment
Service staff, within local budget allocations.  Applications were made on
standard forms, which collected details of the client’s circumstances, job
and earnings, with the Adviser’s ‘declaration of eligibility’, and forwarded
to Employment Service Payment Offices.  Payments were made directly
into a bank or building society account or by giro.  Jobmatch includes an
Adviser support component, the formal purpose of which is to help people
manage the loss of their Jobmatch payments at the end of the 26 week
period, in ways appropriate to circumstances, for example by encouraging
and helping them to increase their hours or earnings.  Advisers decide
how to offer this support component, according to circumstances and
requirements of individual clients.  In some cases, this may involve in-
work contacts or visits during the six month period of receipt.
The approach taken was similar to that described for other measures,
exploring experiences and views of clients who had used Jobmatch;
understanding of the measure among other clients, and their views about
possible usefulness for themselves, and the experiences and views of staff
in key agencies.
Those who had used Jobmatch learned about it first when they were
discussing, with a Personal Adviser or Disability Employment Adviser, a
job they had been offered of less than 30 hours.
Most of those who had been offered a job had not been looking for full-
time work, as they felt their health condition or impairment limited the
amount of work they could do.  The main attraction of Jobmatch for
some had been the support that the Adviser would provide.  Indeed, it
was clear that some people thought of Jobmatch more as a scheme to
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provide in-work encouragement and support than as a financial measure.
People whose main hesitation was whether their health would stand up,
such as people who had had long periods of mental illness, felt they
needed support while in the job, and Jobmatch, as described to them,
sounded ideal.  For them, the £ 50 payment sometimes seemed like an
added bonus.  For those whose main anxiety was whether they could do
the work, the payment of £ 50 was also less important than the suitability
of the work, and continuing support if they could not continue the job,
although the weekly payments were welcome.  None of these users felt
that they would not have taken the jobs without Jobmatch, but those
recovering from mental illness said that it would have been harder for
them to stay in the job without the support and encouragement from the
Disability Employment Adviser or Personal Adviser.
For others, however, the weekly payment was the main attraction. A
man who had found a job of three days per week could not afford to take
it without financial support, and Jobmatch, he believed, made the move
viable financially.  He would not have taken the job without the extra
payments.
The application process was not recalled as problematic. The only negative
comment came from a person who wished he had known about Jobmatch
earlier in his plans to return to work.
When interviewed, those who had been mostly attracted by the support
element of Jobmatch were in work and felt they had made a successful
transition.  People who had kept well were working for more than 16
hours weekly, either in the same or different jobs.  Loss of Jobmatch
payments had been softened for some by increased earnings or receipt of
tax credits.  Those still working short hours either felt that this was right
for them, or had started to think about increasing their hours.  People
still receiving Jobmatch, who knew this would come to an end shortly,
were optimistic about being able to manage financially when payments
ended.
The person who had responded to Jobmatch because he needed the
money had left work by the time of the interviews.  Even working 28
hours with Jobmatch payments, he felt no better off financially; there
was pressure from the employer to work longer hours which he could
not manage, and a work aid he had asked the employer to provide had
not arrived.
Apart from those who had used Jobmatch, most clients thought they had
not heard of this before.  There was some confusion with ‘job matching’
services offered by the Personal Adviser Service.
People who had not heard of Jobmatch or were unsure about the way it
worked listened to the researcher’s explanation.  There was considerable
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interest among people who thought they might aim towards part-time
work.  The general feeling was that Jobmatch could be useful if there was
a realistic job offer.  The main concern was what would happen at the
end of six months, in financial terms, if people were not able to increase
hours of work or earnings.  Losing £ 50 a week seemed a big loss, and
considerable risk was perceived. People were also concerned about the
possible impact of Jobmatch on other benefits and interaction with tax
credits.  There was a feeling that the money payments were too short-
term, and using the measure would introduce too many long-term risks
for it to be a real incentive to leave incapacity benefits for part-time
work.
There was limited awareness and understanding about this measure among
staff.  Some Benefits Agency staff had heard of it, but had not been
certain it was available to people moving off incapacity benefits until the
discussion with the researcher.
Front line Employment Service staff did not feel equipped to discuss the
measure themselves with incapacity benefit claimants if that situation
should ever arise.  Most Disability Employment Advisers had no
experience of discussing the measure with incapacity benefits claimants.
Personal Advisers had discussed the measure with colleagues, but there
was very limited experience of providing information and advice to clients.
In general, Personal Advisers had reservations about Jobmatch. The end
of payments after six months with no opportunity to renew an application,
in contrast with Disabled Person’s Tax Credit, was thought to introduce
elements of considerable risk for clients.  Great care was needed in
discussing with clients what might happen at the end of six months, and
what options might then be available.  Detailed information could be
required about availability of in-work benefits, including housing benefits,
and tax credits, across a range of options including changes in family
circumstances or partner’s work situations.  This put considerable
responsibility on the Adviser to provide accurate information.
A further concern was a perceived potential for misuse.  Personal Advisers
were keenly aware that it was their judgement as to whether the client
was only looking for full-time work, if they acted strictly according to
the rules.  They had other clients who were prepared to take part-time
work and would be worse off financially than on their incapacity benefits
income.  They tried to find solutions, and it was hard not to be able to
recommend Jobmatch.  It could be tempting to point out to clients the
significance of the way they talked about working hours, in order to help
them describe plans in ways that would legitimise offers of Jobmatch.
Advisers speculated on the appropriateness of this form of discretion,
which might be open to abuse.  (We saw in the previous section that
some users of Jobmatch told the researcher they had been looking for
part-time work all along, but we do not know why they had been
considered suitable applicants for Jobmatch.)
7.5  Putting the measure into
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An additional problem staff identified for clients was that a person could
not move from therapeutic work to working for the same employer
with Jobmatch, which might be a progression which would suit some
people.
In general, Advisers preferred to promote Disabled Person’s Tax Credit
to people with low earnings, which was more transparent and could be
renewed at the end of six months.
Only one Personal Adviser had experience of helping a client access
Jobmatch, and this was reported as a relatively straightforward matter.
There was very little experience of Jobmatch among the New Deal clients
interviewed in the Personal Adviser  Service research project.  Only one
claimant had actually used the measure.  This person said that the
administration of payments had taken a long time, partly because the
claim form had not been fully completed by her Personal Adviser.  Out
of pocket for a while, this person continued working in order not to lose
the chance of having a job, but the job proved unsuitable, and soon
ended, for health reasons.
The staff of the pilots offered the general comment that Jobmatch could
be useful for some claimants but they had used it on few occasions.
There was a general feeling that tax credits were usually a more suitable
form of help for people taking low paid, part-time work.  However, if a
client was ineligible for tax credits Jobmatch might be a useful alternative.
Although Jobmatch was little used by incapacity benefits claimants, several
issues for consideration by policy makers emerged from the research:
• findings suggest that the policy intention, of encouraging clients to
take part-time jobs with Jobmatch if they were not able to get full-
time jobs, was not always being met
• in this small study, the support component of Jobmatch was identified
as more important than the money payments by some clients
• there was evidence that this support had helped people to stay in jobs
and to move forward to more substantial paid work
• there was evidence that the money payments could be an incentive to
take part-time work, but that clients who responded to this incentive
did not always feel financially better-off than when on benefits
• there was lack of experience of the measure among staff in all agencies,
and some unease about the discretionary component of information
and advice-giving
The Department’s own management information statistics showed that
take-up of this measure remained low throughout the pilot period.  No
new awards of Jobmatch for people leaving incapacity benefits were made
for jobs starting after 30 June 2000.
7.5.3  Implementation
7.6  Evidence from the New
Deal for Disabled People
Personal Adviser pilots
7.7  Issues for policy
69
The current ‘linking rule’ has been in operation since October 1998, and
was introduced specifically to reduce risk and uncertainties faced by people
considering a move into work.  It was known that some people feared
the possible reduction in income level and income security that would
result if they found they were unable to sustain paid work.  The measure
enables people to return to the same benefits5  they were receiving before
they started work or training, if they became incapable again within the
52 week period following their leaving benefits or credits received on
the grounds of incapacity to work.  Work or training for work must start
within seven days of the last day of benefit entitlement, to ensure that
this was the reason for leaving benefit.  The rule also requires the claimant
to notify the Benefits Agency within one month of ceasing to be entitled
to benefit that they have started work or training.
The legal provisions apply across the whole country, but are particularly
important in protecting people participating in the New Deal for Disabled
People pilot projects, who may be encouraged to try work or training.
Benefits Agency decision makers take decisions about qualification to
use the rule when the person concerned seeks to return to benefit, using
records held on the central Benefits Agency computer.  Qualification
thus depends on having previously notified the Benefits Agency properly
about moving off incapacity benefits to start work or training.
Sustaining daily work on a regular basis may seem hard, and some people
need regular breaks from work through the day (Arthur et al., 1999).
People worry that working arrangements will not be flexible enough to
enable them to continue working.  Health conditions which fluctuate
over time lead to additional anxieties about moving to work.  People
who face unpredictable onset of debilitating back pain, for example, or
the possibility of recurrence of symptoms of mental illness, worry about
what will happen if they get ill again, after they have taken a job (Arthur
et al., 1999).  People perceive risks both in income and security: having
to return to lower-level sickness benefits after what might prove to be
just a short time in a job, and the requirement for new medical certification
and assessments which might lead to loss of incapacity benefits altogether.
THE 52 WEEK LINKING RULE8
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5 The rule enables people previously claiming Incapacity Benefit or Severe Disablement
Allowance to return to the same rate of benefit.  Those previously claiming Income
Support and other income-related benefits may return to these if they are accepted as
continuing to be incapable of work, but the amount they then receive depends on
their circumstances when they reclaim.  Even without a linking rule people can claim
Income Support and other income-related benefits if they are accepted as incapable of
work, and their circumstances allow it.  The linking rule, however, removes the need
for people to re-serve the qualifying periods for disability premium and mortgage
interest if a person subsequently claims again because of their incapacity.
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Anxieties about having to leave work again are well-founded. R esearch
on people who moved from incapacity benefits into work by using
Disability Working Allowance (the precursor of Disabled Person’s Tax
Credit) showed that two out of three subsequently left because of ill
health or disability (Arthur and Zarb, 1997).
Administration of the linking rule depends to a considerable extent on
people notifying the Benefits Agency when they leave incapacity benefits
to start work or training.  At the end of a period on benefits or credits on
the grounds of incapacity the Benefits Agency sends the claimant a letter,
with a form to return if they start work or training within seven days of
the last day of benefit entitlement.  Notification must be received by the
Benefits Agency within one month of the last date of receipt of incapacity
benefits or credits.  (These limits aim to give people time to deal with
paper work during a change in circumstances, but ensure that the reason
for leaving incapacity benefits or credits was indeed to start work or
training.)
The letter to the claimant also asks them to pass it on to their new
employer.  This is because if they become sick again within 52 weeks
their employer will not have to pay them Statutory Sick Pay, but should
give them a form which can be used to reclaim the previous incapacity
benefits or credits.  In practice, implementation of the linking rule depends
to some extent on former claimants and employers remembering what
to do and dealing appropriately with the relevant letters and forms.
When the Benefits Agency receives the notification that a claimant has
started work or training, the information is entered onto the central
computer.  From that point the computer displays show that the person
has 52 weeks protection whenever their record is accessed.  Should he or
she then reapply for benefits, their entitlement to return to previous
benefits becomes clear.  Medical certification from a GP is required if the
claim is for more than seven days until such time as the client undergoes
another Personal Capability Assessment.  R eminders are sent to clients
who have not submitted certificates, but if none are forthcoming within
around three weeks, then the Benefits Agency will send out a questionnaire
as the first stage of a Personal Capability Assessment in order to give a
definite decision about entitlement.
No clients were invited to take part in this study on the basis that they
had used the 52 week linking rule.  The approach taken was to ask all
clients interviewed what they knew about the rule, how far they
understood the procedures and implications and whether they felt this
measure might be useful in the future, or influence any future decisions
about working.  Discussions revealed that some people did have experience
of reclaiming, or trying to reclaim incapacity benefits, and their views
were valuable.
8.1.3  Administrative procedures
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Benefits Agency staff were asked about their experience of implementation
of the rule and issues arising, and Employment Service staff and Personal
Advisers were asked how they discussed the rule with their clients, and
how influential this measure appeared to be.
People who said they had never heard about the linking rule included
some whose health condition meant that they were not currently thinking
about work, and had not recently been in touch with a Jobcentre, or
talked to a Personal Adviser or Disability Employment Adviser.  It was
perhaps surprising that some clients who were currently receiving advice
and support from a Disability Employment Adviser or Personal Adviser
also said that they did not know about the linking rule.  The researchers’
own experience during the discussions was that it was sometimes hard
for people to understand the purpose of the rule and how it worked,
even with careful explanation.
People who did know about the rule when interviewed included some
who had discovered what it meant only after they had left their jobs.
They tried to claim sick pay or reclaim benefits and were told that their
situation was protected and they could return to their previous incapacity
benefits.  This suggests that some people fill in the forms required when
they leave benefit without properly understanding the purpose.
Others, however, knew about the rule before it came into operation for
them, or during the period on incapacity benefits or credits.  There was
evidence that information is flowing from a variety of sources, including
front-line Employment Service and Benefits Agency staff, Disability
Employment Advisers, Personal Advisers, training providers and support
organisations.  Nobody mentioned their GP as a source of information.
There was also evidence that people search for and value written
information about the linking rule in standard Benefits Agency leaflets.
For some people, it is important to see authoritative written information
about an issue which can be of great importance.
The general view, among those who were working when interviewed
and those who were thinking about work or engaged on work-related
activities, was that this was a helpful arrangement.  It took some of the
risk out of coming off incapacity benefits, and provided some reassurance
and confidence.  However, there was some misunderstanding, in that
people sometimes believed that the rule protected them if made redundant,
or if they gave up work for reasons other than health or impairment,
without also satisfying the conditions of entitlement in respect of incapacity
for work.
Those who said that knowing about the linking rule had influenced
decisions about taking a job or doing a training course included people
who had partners and children to support from earned income; people
who had fluctuating and unpredictable conditions; people who expected
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continued pain, fatigue or symptoms of mental illness, and people who
had not had recent work experience.
Those who had been influenced by knowing they could return to benefits
had sometimes had to use the rule, when health failed or symptoms got
worse.  The experience of being able to go back to benefits and finding
that the rule did work for them encouraged those people when they
were ready to try work again, and the group included some people who
had already used the rule and then returned to work feeling confident of
some income security in the future.  Knowing about the rule, and
experience of using it successfully, could both act to influence decisions
about leaving incapacity benefits.  As we see in Section 8.3.3, being
influenced in taking work by the security offered by the linking rule, and
then experiencing problems or failure in accessing it, could be a big
blow, and a disincentive to try work again.
There was no evidence that anybody in this study group deliberately
gave up work at the end of the 52 weeks in order to regain incapacity
benefits.  However, one person said that when she found her work too
hard and began to think she would be unable to continue, she decided to
give in her notice before the eighth week because she knew her claim to
incapacity benefits would be linked back to the earlier claim.6
People who had discovered the rule after they had decided to take a job
or already moved into work said that this had been ‘a great relief’ and ‘very
reassuring’.  They felt that knowing about this rule was likely to be
influential if their circumstances changed, and they found themselves
again thinking about moving to work from incapacity benefits in the
future.
People who were further away from work when interviewed generally
expressed positive interest in the rule.  For some the current key influences
on thinking about work were their health or impairment, or the availability
of suitable work, but such people often said that the linking rule was
something to keep in mind for the future, or something they might want
to know more about later on.  Among those who first learned about the
rule from the researcher were people who regretted their previous lack
of knowledge and might have made different decisions.  One man
currently doing therapeutic work said that he probably would not have
turned down a previous full-time job offer if he had known about the
linking rule.  Some anxieties were expressed that the rule would be hard
to access, and that there would be unforeseen disadvantages.
Experiences of reclaiming or trying to reclaim benefits using the linking
rule were variable. For some this had been relatively straightforward.
People who had been upset when they had to leave work appreciated
being dealt with sympathetically in the local Benefits Agency office.
6 This is a separate ‘link’ in benefits.
8.3.3  Experience of administration
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Some, however, had found the process harder than expected.  Having to
get new medical certificates had not been expected, and some people
had not done what was required within the time limits.  Finding the
process could take three months to sort out was a disappointment and
put people off the idea of relying on the rule in the future.
One person spoke of his experience with bitterness.  Although he had
visited the local Benefits Agency in person to explain that he had started
work this notification had not been entered onto the computer, and he
found he was not entitled to return to incapacity benefits when his job
ended after several periods of sick leave.  He claimed Jobseeker’s
Allowance, and subsequently experienced serious financial problems.
Believing he could rely on the linking rule had been a strong influence
on taking the job, and, understandably, this person was angry and critical.
Staff in the Benefits Agency expected to provide information and advice
about the rule on request, but not actively to promote it.  In one area the
Benefits Agency office had arranged special training for staff in the local
Personal Adviser Service pilot project, when it became apparent that
Personal Advisers did not have full information about procedures for
implementation, and some of their clients had been wrongly advised.
Disability Employment Advisers drew many clients’ attention to the
linking rule.  When discussing with incapacity benefits claimants
possibilities for trying or going back to work the 52 week linking rule
was often one of the measures that they mentioned at an early stage,
especially if a client expressed anxiety about risks of loss of income or
income security.  In general, Disability Employment Advisers did not
have detailed knowledge about procedures for setting up eligibility, or
reclaiming benefits using the rule, and expected to refer clients to the
Benefits Agency for full information.
Personal Advisers also mentioned the rule at an early stage in discussion
with many of their clients.  The literature and advertising produced by
some of the pilot projects promoted the 52 week linking rule as a way of
helping incapacity benefits claimants move into work.
Disability Employment Advisers and Personal Advisers perceived the
linking rule as a powerful incentive for people who were thinking about
work.  Their experience was that potential loss of incapacity benefit
income and anxieties about being able to sustain work if health deteriorated
were major barriers to some of their clients.  Knowing that they could
return to the same benefit at the same level at any time within the first
year of employment provided some with sufficient reassurance and
confidence to go forward.  They saw the rule as an essential component
in welfare to work initiatives for incapacity benefits claimants.
8.4  Putting the linking rule
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When things did not work out as expected, and their clients found it
hard to access the rule, this could be a disappointment with serious
consequences for clients, and undermined the confidence of Advisers.
Surprise was expressed in some Benefits Agency offices that there had
been relatively few clients who had returned a form at the end of a
period of incapacity benefits, providing information which would entitle
them to use the linking rule.  There was no statistical information to
back up their feelings, but they believed that there might be a ‘take-up’
problem at this stage and that some clients who tried to reclaim their
benefits in the future would be unsuccessful.
Their experience was that some clients had not understood that returning
to benefits was not automatic and required new medical certification,
nor that Own Occupation and All Work Tests started to come into
operation again.  Clients who had not expected these conditions could
be disappointed and upset.
Disability Employment Advisers taking part in this study knew little about
clients’ experience of implementation.  Personal Advisers had mixed
experiences. In one area, they had not been told about particular problems.
However, in another area Personal Advisers had been surprised to discover
some of the details of implementation, through their contacts with clients
who had tried to reclaim benefits.  They had not understood requirements
for medical certification, or work tests, and regretted that some clients
had been given wrong information by the project.  Arrangements had
been made with the local Benefits Agency office for a training and
information programme for the Personal Adviser Service project, to fill
some of the gaps in staff knowledge.
The findings from the Personal Adviser Service research regarding the
52 week linking rule are similar to those reported above.  Many of the
clients interviewed who were either in work or close to work had been
told that their former level of benefit was protected if they had to leave
their jobs.  For many this had been an important influence in their decision
to take work.  Everyone who knew about the linking rule thought it was
a useful provision.  Again, there was mistaken belief that the rule protected
people against redundancy, without understanding that protection
depended on satisfying the conditions of entitlement in respect of
incapacity for work.
There were also examples of people experiencing unexpected difficulties
in reclaiming benefit if they did leave their job.  Filling in application
forms and having to obtain further sickness certification came as a surprise
to some.  From some people’s accounts of their experiences, it appeared
that they had to make a completely fresh application for benefit, perhaps
because they had not satisfied one of the administrative requirements of
the linking rule.
8.5  Implementation
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A small number of clients learned about the linking rule from a source
other than a Personal Adviser. For example, one client heard about it in
the course of claiming Disability Working Allowance, another client was
told by the local Citizens Advice Bureau.  Some people interviewed
described circumstances that suggested to the researcher that they might
have benefited from the linking rule but appeared not to have known
about it.  There are indications, therefore, that knowledge about the
principles and purpose of the linking rule is generally common among
most Personal Adviser Service staff (and outside organisations) but that
there is some variability in the information given to their clients.
There are several issues regarding the 52 week linking rule that have
emerged from the research which have implications for policy:
• knowing about the 52 week linking rule can influence decisions to
move into work
• the rule reduces some of the risks and anxieties about loss of income
and security attached to moving into work, and is generally appreciated
by clients
• the incentive effect is currently reduced by lack of awareness of the
rule
• the incentive effect is also reduced by anxiety that the rule will be hard
to access, and some people’s experience that this is indeed the case
• putting the rule into operation requires understanding and action by
the Benefits Agency, clients and GPs.  There is some evidence that
within this system, some people for whom the rule was designed do
not get access
• problems in accessing the rule, or failure to reclaim benefits, can have
serious negative outcomes for clients, which in turn act as a disincentive
to further moves and reduce confidence in the measure, both in the
claiming population and among Advisers
• there was evidence that the details of the linking rule were not initially
fully understood by staff promoting its use
8.7  Issues for policy
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This chapter is concerned with tax credits.  Although not the main focus
of the study, tax credits are important in the overall context of work
incentives.
Working Families’ Tax Credit and Disabled Person’s Tax Credit are key
components in the government’s strategy to ‘make work pay’, and were
introduced in October 1999 replacing Family Credit and Disability
Working Allowance.  The policy objective of Disability Working
Allowance was twofold: to encourage disabled people who wanted to
work to leave incapacity benefits, and to provide financial assistance to
disabled people who were already in work (R owlingson and Berthoud,
1996).  The aim of Disabled Person’s Tax Credit is ‘to make work pay
for disabled people whether in work or returning to work’ (HM Treasury,
2000).  It probably acts both as a long-term subsidy to low-paid
employment and as a short-term support for people whose earnings are
reduced for a time during ill-health, and its role in job retention has been
strengthened in October 2000 by creation of a fast track to Disabled
Person’s Tax Credit for people who are currently off work sick but have
a job to go back to.  Knowing about Disabled Person’s Tax Credit and/
or Working Families’ Tax Credit while claiming incapacity benefits might
influence decisions about working.
The eligibility criteria for Disabled Person’s Tax Credit are complex.
The person must have a physical or mental disability which puts them at
a disadvantage in getting a job; and must be, or have been, receiving an
incapacity or disability benefit.  The amount of entitlement depends on
the hours of work, the size of the person’s family, the ages of any children
and whether any are disabled, and any child care costs.  The maximum
amount available for each set of circumstances is then reduced by 55 per
cent of the amount by which family income exceeds a ‘threshold’ figure.
Administration of tax credits is the responsibility of the Inland R evenue.
By January 2000, when the current study was conducted, there were
some 15,000 people receiving Disabled Person’s Tax Credit and some
6,000 with on-going Disability Working Allowance claims.
The Inland R evenue has commissioned research to explore the views
and experiences of their clients claiming tax credits and their administrative
staff.
Previous research on Disability Working Allowance showed that this
was largely unsuccessful in encouraging disabled people who wanted to
work to leave incapacity benefits.  During 1992 to 1995 only two per
RELATED ISSUES: TAX CREDITS9
9.1  Tax credits
9.1.1  The policy context
9.1.2  What was known already
78
cent of working age recipients of the main incapacity benefits moved
into full-time work, and most of those did this without the help of
Disability Working Allowance (R owlingson and Berthoud, 1996).
Rowlingson and Berthoud discussed possible reasons for this lack of success
including lack of expectation of working among people who saw their
impairment as a major barrier to work; the desire, especially among men,
of having a ‘proper job’ which meant independence from the state; low
awareness of the benefit, and just not taking the benefit into account
when looking for jobs.
There is some evidence that knowing about the tax credit can reassure
disabled people that they can afford to take a job (Beyer et al., 2000).
There is also evidence that people interested in moving towards work
from incapacity benefits value informed advice about in-work financial
support including tax credits, and information provided on an individual
basis with ‘better-off calculations’ including tax credits can influence
people’s views about working (Arthur et al., 1999).
Economic studies of in-work credits for working families such as Family
Credit and the Earned Income Tax Credit in the USA (see, for example,
Eissa and Liebman, 1996) generally suggest that such credits have the
potential to raise labour market participation among poorer families.  We
do not yet know whether any such patterns can be seen in relation to
Disabled Person’s Tax Credit.
Tax credits were not a focus for attention in this study, being the
responsibility of the Inland R evenue which is conducting evaluative
research.  However, the generic approach taken in looking at the overall
package of work incentives for disabled people and people with long-
term health problems meant that it would be inappropriate to ignore tax
credits, which were anyway likely to emerge in discussions with
respondents.
Thus, all clients were asked about their knowledge and understanding of
tax credits, especially Disabled Person’s Tax Credit and where clients
had experience of these, views were sought on their influence on decisions
about work.  Findings are relevant to the general development of work
incentives overall, and help to throw further light on the way that clients
perceive tax credits as an incentive to work.  The researchers did not
attempt detailed explanations about the tax credits for clients who had
little knowledge, but told people who were interested how they might
get more information.
Views about tax credits were not systematically explored among staff
participating in this study.
Briefly, people claim Disabled Person’s Tax Credit on a standard form
which is sent to the Inland R evenue.  Entitlement is calculated and
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claimants informed of decisions and amounts of entitlement.  The Inland
R evenue generally tries to make arrangement for credits to be paid by
employers in the wage packet, and employers deduct monies paid out
from their own overall contributions.  Where payments are not made
through employers, credits are paid by giro or into bank or building
society accounts (for example to self-employed people).
Credits remain in payment for six months, with no adjustment for most
changes in circumstances, and claims may be renewed for as long as
eligibility criteria are met.
In this study group, people claiming tax credits when interviewed had
generally had help with applications from Personal Advisers.  Some lone
parents were very familiar with this kind of in-work financial support,
and had assumed that a transition from benefits would involve Working
Families’ Tax Credit but learned about Disabled Person’s Tax Credit
from their Adviser.  Other people were claiming Working Families’ Tax
Credit because they had not been on benefit long enough to qualify for
Disabled Person’s Tax Credit, or because a claim for Disabled Person’s
Tax Credit had been refused and they had successfully claimed the other
credit while waiting for an appeal to be heard.  Estimates of likely
entitlements to tax credits had been made in ‘better-off’ calculations by
Personal Advisers and, for some, these assessments had been influential in
decisions about working.  This was especially the case where people had
high entitlements of £ 50 or over weekly.
Estimates of lower amounts of entitlement had been less influential in
decisions about work, but people agreed that ‘every little helps’.
Among those who had not used a tax credit, or the benefits which
immediately preceded these, few had never heard of them at all.  Most
had some idea that there were ways of topping up earnings, although not
all realised that responsibility had passed to the Inland R evenue.  The
general view was that the time to get detailed information about such
measures was when people had an actual job in mind, when they would
need to ‘go into it all’.
Where anxieties were expressed, these related to dealing with the Inland
R evenue for the first time, and for some, reluctance to involve the
employer because s/ he would get to know about a history of ill-health.
Some people were generally put off by the idea of a ‘means test’, and
others expected a complex procedure.
In the research into the experiences of Personal Adviser Service pilot
project clients, several had had experience of Disability Working
Allowance and/ or tax credits.  Among the small number of current
recipients there was general satisfaction in the help that tax credits provided.
One self-employed client, for example, referred to the importance of a
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stable source of income in the early stages of setting up and trying to
establish his business.
Seeing ‘better-off calculations’ including Family Credit, Disability
Working Allowance or the tax credits could be critical in decisions made.
While some of the earlier entrants to the service had felt that Advisers
lacked knowledge and competence in these areas of financial support,
there was some evidence that this part of the service had been strengthened
as it developed.  There was evidence, however, that some clients had
received wrong information about tax credits.  In one case this led directly
to return to incapacity benefits.
In this small study, in which tax credits were not the main focus of
enquiry, findings suggested that:
• when the tax credits acted as incentives, this was right at the point of
decision-making, when detailed financial information may be critical
• knowing generally about tax credits at earlier stages in thinking about
moving to work had rather little influence, unless people had previous
positive experiences of receipt of this kind of support
• there was general awareness that there were ways of boosting low
earnings, but people had out-of-date information, and often did not
realise the Inland R evenue was involved
• the potential impact of tax credits as an encouragement to move into
work is limited by lack of knowledge and the fact that expert help is
usually needed in order to work out entitlement
9.6  Issues for policy
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This report has presented findings from qualitative research into the
experiences of incapacity benefits claimants and staff of the Benefits
Agency, Employment Service and New Deal for Disabled People Personal
Adviser Service pilots of a number of measures designed to act as work
incentives.
Four measures were introduced for incapacity benefit claimants in April,
1999 and piloted for one year:
• incapacity earnings provision
• Work Trial
• Jobfinder’s Grant
• Jobmatch payments
We refer to these as the four pilot measures.  Another three measures
included in this research  were generally available to people claiming
incapacity benefits:
• therapeutic work
• voluntary work
• the 52-week linking rule
These seven measures are conceptually different: variously intended to
enable people to try the work environment; to ease the transition to
work; to boost low earnings and make work pay; or to provide safety
nets or anchor lines to enable people who find they cannot work to
reclaim benefits.
In the course of the research we also gathered information on people’s
experiences of Disabled Person’s Tax Credit and Working Families’ Tax
Credit which can be of relevance for people starting or returning to
work.  Chapters 2 - 9 have presented findings about each of the work
incentives and have concluded with some issues for future policy.  This
final chapter presents an overview.  Drawing on views of clients and staff
on the role of work incentives in decisions made about work, we discuss
some general issues that might inform policy on how to assist people on
incapacity benefits wishing to undertake some form of paid work.
It is important to remember that the measures on which the study focuses
were not put together as a coherent package of work incentives, but
were more a grouping of established arrangements within social security
and employment schemes, some of which were being newly extended to
incapacity benefits claimants for a pilot period.
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10.1  Introduction
10.2  Scope of the study
82
The study was small-scale and exploratory, and the researchers had to be
flexible in dealing with the complexities involved in identifying and
sampling clients who had used some of the measures.  We believe that
the study has made a useful contribution to understanding how clients
perceive what in policy terms are called work incentives, and when and
why these are influential in decisions about working.  The study has also
thrown light on the way in which key staff interpret the role of the
measures, and their own role in putting these into operation.
This study was not designed to evaluate the pilots, and staff who
participated in the study were not always those who had key roles in
managing or implementing the pilots.  Care must therefore be taken in
drawing conclusions about the way in which the pilot was conducted in
the areas studied, or the way in which the measures were promoted.
Some useful lessons did emerge, however.  There was a feeling among
staff that initial energy and commitment to general promotion of the
four pilot measures (as compared with advice-giving to individual clients)
had been high at the beginning of the pilot period, but lessened as the
year went on.  It was suggested that this may have been related to resources
available, for example in promoting the measures, in addition to
complexities of working across agencies.
An important general finding for policy-makers is that the language in
which people chose to discuss the influence of the various measures was
one of ‘enabling’ or ‘helping them’, or ‘making things easier’.  It was often
not the language of ‘incentives’ - a word which people attached more to
concepts of motivation or being persuaded to do something unattractive,
which did not fit their attitude towards working.
Clients talked generally about their views on working and how they
made decisions.  Key influences on decisions about working included:
• current health condition or impairment and how this affected their
capacity for work
• expectations of developments in their health condition: hopes for
improvement or stabilisation, or expectation of deterioration or relapse
• age, stage in life cycle and family responsibilities
• availability of a suitable job
• practical support into and during work
• maintaining income security and adequacy, or, at least, avoiding too
great a risk
Discussion showed that the work incentive measures were influential in
so far as they made a contribution to any of the above.
As this and other research has shown, incapacity benefits claimants are
people with a wide range of personal characteristics with very different
opportunities and responsibilities, so each of the above factors had different
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significance for individual people.  As clients explained, a person in pressing
financial need might be more strongly influenced by the need for financial
security than a person who had additional sources of financial support,
from pensions or other household members.  A person with few skills,
no experience of work and many constraints as a result of their health
condition might be particularly influenced by the availability of practical
support than somebody who had greater choice in the labour market and
more confidence.  To the extent that people faced different barriers and
obstacles in moving towards work, some measures were relevant to them,
and others not.
This helps us understand some of our findings, for example why some
people attached such high value to the support component of Jobmatch
while others thought mainly about the money involved, and why some
people emphasised that although Jobfinder’s Grant had been welcome, it
could never be influential, because for them the key factor was finding
an opportunity that was suitable.
People also considered the various measures according to where they
saw themselves in a progression from not working at all, to trying some
work, to working full-time and coming off incapacity benefits altogether.
People had different plans and aspirations, which spanned different time
scales.  This helps us understand why some of the measures seemed out
of scope altogether, while some were of immediate importance and
relevance.  Somebody who felt they were only ever going to be able to
do a few hours work found it hard to engage with a measure such as
Work Trial, whereas when such a person learned, in the interview, about
the possibility of doing therapeutic work, the content and direction of
the discussion itself, the interest shown and the questions asked were a
demonstration of the potential influence of this measure on such a person.
On the other hand, people currently applying for full-time work did not
see voluntary work as relevant to themselves.
One issue here is the concentration of the work incentive measures around
the point of moving across the 16-hour threshold, or the period just
after.  Many incapacity benefit claimants are at an earlier stage in their
progression towards work and might respond more to incentives to try
work.
The work incentive measures covered in the research are designed partly
to reduce risk and uncertainty.  Clients emphasised the importance of
maintaining income security and adequacy, and obstacles perceived
included:
• the risk of losing incapacity benefits altogether
• a risky transition period in moving off incapacity benefits onto earnings
• belief that they were unable to afford work
• belief that work will not lead to being better off
10.5  R isk and uncertainty
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• being unable to sustain paid work
• not understanding the opportunities and constraints of the benefits/
tax credits systems
In so far as the measures appeared to provide ways of overcoming these
barriers, thus removing or allaying anxieties, they could be influential.
Thus the 52 week linking rule was thought to be a very important ‘safety
net’ for people who were not confident their health would stand up,
which influenced behaviour.  The tax credits and Jobmatch could help
people who thought they could not earn enough for a job to be financially
viable.  Knowing about measures which smoothed the transition could
be influential - mentioned here were benefit ‘run-ons’ in Income Support
and Housing Benefit.  The influence of such measures, again, depended
on people being aware of the measures, people understanding the rules
and believing they would work properly for them.
In so far as the measures appeared to create new obstacles, thus increasing
anxieties or failing to allay fears, their influence as incentives to try work
were muted.  If trying to do some therapeutic work or voluntary work
could result in failing the All Work Test and subsequent loss of incapacity
benefits, this was a big disadvantage and too great a risk to take.  The
anticipated ending of Jobmatch after six months introduced a new form
of insecurity and reduced its potential positive influence.  Measures which
might involve an employer knowing about a health condition were
avoided by some people, as this was perceived as introducing new risk.
People saw problems in terms of the timing and levels of relevant
knowledge which they might attain.  In addition, people were wary that,
in the real world, delays, administrative confusions, errors and inefficiencies
meant that systems which worked in theory might let them down.  This
acted to reduce the incentive effect.
Management statistics indicate that take-up of the four pilot measures
remained relatively low throughout the pilot period, and this study throws
light on some of the contributory factors.  General awareness and
knowledge of the pilot measures among clients, and indeed measures
such as therapeutic work, was low.  The availability of the different
measures to this client group was not always understood by front-line
administrative staff in the Benefits Agency or Employment Service.  The
idea of encouraging incapacity benefits claimants to do some work has
not been the traditional approach of the Benefits Agency, and it is taking
time for staff to adjust to this new way of working.
The ways in which the work incentive measures were promoted were
likely to have affected take-up.  In some cases the policy was to advertise
widely, for example for Jobfinder’s Grant, but other measures were
promoted among staff as part of their ‘tool kit’ for helping their clients
rather than entitlements that people could claim.  As mentioned above
findings have also shown that some incapacity benefit claimants do not
10.6  Take-up of the pilot
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make applications for some kinds of help because they do not want to be
labelled as ‘disabled’, or do not want existing or potential employers to
know about their health condition or impairment.
Sometimes the measures themselves were not suited to what clients needed
to help them move towards work, or there were other, better-suited
options available, such as Work Preparation instead of Work Trial.  Some
people could not take advantage of a measure because they fell outside
the eligibility criteria, for example the Jobfinder’s Grant earnings or savings
limits.  Complicated administrative procedures can make some measures,
such as Work Trial, unattractive, or the value of the measure may be too
small to attract takers (such as the £ 15 incapacity earnings provision).
The extent to which the measures have been used partly reflects the
input from advisers and benefit staff.  Their knowledge and experience
will have an influence on when, if at all, they discuss or recommend
particular work incentive measures to their clients, who are therefore
dependent on advisers to use their knowledge efficiently and effectively
in their interests.  There is the danger that incentive and rewards schemes
adopted by the Benefits Agency, Employment Service or New Deal
agencies encourage advisers and officials to make decisions or weight
their advice in the direction of outcomes that contribute to the
achievement of performance targets rather than necessarily being in the
optimal interest of their clients.
While the measures can be seen as attempts at adapting existing policy to
respond to known barriers in returning to work, the resulting complexity
of arrangements can have negative consequences.  It is unlikely that many
clients would ever be in a position comparable to advisers of having
sufficient knowledge about work incentive measures to weigh up all the
possible options open to them.  Any individual wishing to pursue their
own path back to work, without the intervention of an adviser, can
therefore put themselves at a disadvantage.
Making claimants in effect dependent on professional advisers also makes
them vulnerable to mistakes and poor advice. This research has shown
examples of where clients have suffered as a result of errors in decision
making or advice which is ill-suited to their particular needs.
The role of employers in the operation of the work incentive measures
was not included in the terms of reference for this research. Employers
can be as much ‘users’ of the measures as incapacity benefit claimants
themselves. There is some research evidence from claimants and from
advice and benefit staff about the role of employers, including:
• the observation that employers, as well as claimants, need to know and
understand the work incentive measures if they are to be effective
• clients’ fears of negative or discriminatory attitudes of employers who
might learn of an employee’s background
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• fears that some employers exploit work incentive measures, by for
example, ending jobs when subsidies run out, paying wages below the
statutory minimum wage, or using periods of Work Trial as unpaid
labour
• beliefs that some employers would be reluctant to become involved
with the administrative work required with tax credits
• concerns that employers would find the monitoring of some measures
(such as Jobmatch and Work Trial) time-consuming and disruptive
• difficulties in obtaining allowed expenses from employers
• the lack of opportunities for voluntary work in some types of work
A fuller understanding of the operation and impact of any new work
incentive measures would be obtained if employers are included in any
future research.
There has been particular policy interest in the operation and impact of
therapeutic work.  A number of observations and insights from the
research, drawn particularly from the group exercise carried out towards
the end of the project, might be useful here in future thinking about the
extent to which claimants of Incapacity Benefit should be allowed to
engage in ‘permitted work’ while still in receipt of benefit.
For example, relaxation of the eligibility criteria for therapeutic work,
such as removing the requirement that work should have some therapeutic
value, would have a range of effects.  First it would allow people whose
conditions are stable to increase their incomes from a limited amount of
work.  (This would answer one of the long-standing criticisms of
therapeutic work mentioned in Chapter 2.)  The need for any medical
input would be removed, thus reducing the administrative burden on
staff, speeding up decision making, and reducing the burdens of time and
hassle on claimants.  Some of the inequity in decision making, arising
from the subjective nature of GPs’ assessments of their patients and
decisions made by different Benefits Agency decision-makers, would also
be removed.
Introducing time limits of, for example six months, for the receipt of
‘permitted work’ is another policy option.  This would have the effect of
stopping claimants spending long periods doing therapeutic work, which
then becomes effectively a form of permanent earnings supplement.  One
question raised by this approach is how to deal with people after the
permitted time of six months.  The overall policy objective of helping
people move off incapacity benefits into work may not be well served if
the period is limited.  For some clients of the Employment Service or an
organisation running a New Deal type service, six months may be an
insufficient period to test their ability to sustain full-time employment.
Extending the period for a further period if a client is on the active
caseload of an adviser is a possible option.  This would be to the advantage
10.9  The future of ‘permitted
work’
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of some clients but leaves the policy question of how to deal with people
who need help beyond the extended period, and those who do not want
to be ‘case-managed’.
Introducing a specified time limit would require claimants to notify the
appropriate authorities that they had started work.  This is a requirement
under the existing therapeutic work arrangements but would assume a
greater importance if the end of the six months (or whatever time period)
had to be calculated.  Compliance with this requirement is also important
in order to prevent unnecessary and possibly intrusive intervention from
fraud investigation officers notified of a suspected ‘working and claiming’
case.
There is an opportunity here for clarifying the timing of Personal
Capability Assessments for claimants undertaking some form of ‘permitted
work’ for either an initial six-month period or for an extended period.
R edefining therapeutic work as ‘permitted work’ by removing medical
input and introducing time limits might transform the provision into a
stepping stone to full-time employment rather than a final outcome of a
person’s move towards work.  It does, however, remove one intermediate
employment status (that is, between full- time employment and
unemployment) that suits some incapacity benefit claimants well,
increasing their incomes and promoting their social inclusion.  Policy
needs therefore to consider how the benefit system should treat claimants
with possibly severe impairments who, under the current benefit rules,
have found particular employment niches and who are unlikely to progress
towards full-time paid work.
The current government policy aim of moving people away from
dependence on welfare towards full-time work is being promoted by a
range of active policies across the Departmental responsibilities of the
DSS, DfEE and the Inland R evenue.  These policies have been developed
within the context of a social security system which has traditionally
been a passive provider of cash benefits, and in which there has not been
a specific benefit provision for people with a partial capacity for work.
It has been known for a number of years that the benefit system acts as a
barrier to many people who want to move towards work.  The work
incentive measures that have been the subject of this research are the
latest in a series of policy changes designed to remove or reduce those
barriers.  The findings have shown that each of the measures has the
potential to help some people on the path into work.  The research has
shown how and why the measures have helped, indicated where problems
and difficulties can arise for some people, either due to the substantive
content of the measure or because of shortcomings in implementation,
and explored the reasons why some have been little used.
10.10  Concluding comment
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The range of benefit and employment measures that are aimed at disabled
people and people with long-term health problems is wider and more
diverse than at any time in the recent past.  While modifications and
extensions to existing provisions add to the range of help available, they
also bring added complexity and difficulty which can act against the
interests of individual incapacity benefits claimants.  There is clearly scope
in developing welfare to work policies aimed at people with impairments
or long-term health problems to make progress in balancing these tensions
to the advantage of claimants, employers, and policy makers alike.
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RESEARCH METHODOLOGYAPPENDIX A
The four ‘pilot’ measures were operating in 15 areas, but there was variable
use of these measures when the research was commissioned.  The decision
was taken to conduct fieldwork, primarily, in four areas:
• two areas with an Employment Service Personal Adviser Service
• one area with a Contract Personal Adviser Service
• one area without a Personal Adviser Service
The areas were chosen so that there might be some comparison between
places with and without a Personal Adviser Service, and between places
with Personal Adviser Services led by the Employment Service and on a
Contract basis.  This was important, as it was possible that there would
be different kinds of working arrangements and relationships between
staff in different agencies, and different approaches to promotion and
advertising.  The four areas were chosen to achieve a mix of labour
markets and local characteristics.  Also taken into account were the early
indications of take-up of the various measures in different areas, based on
early management information statistics.  It was important to choose areas
which might be expected to generate enough clients who had used
measures, to build up a study group.  There were also logistical and
resource implications in the choice of areas for study.
The first phase of the research based on discussions and interviews with
administrative staff was conducted in the initial four fieldwork areas.
In the development of the next phase of the research based on interviews
with clients, problems arose in drawing a sample of clients from the original
area without a Personal Adviser Service.  The decision was taken to
introduce a fifth area (another area without a Personal Adviser Service)
in order to achieve the client study.  Additional staff discussions in the
fifth area were arranged at that point.  However, there were problems in
recruitment of clients in the fifth area, as described below.  The clients
who participated thus came mainly from the three areas with Personal
Adviser services.
For the final group exercise, staff who were able to attend came from
areas with both kinds of Personal Adviser Service, and one area with no
such service.
Additional material collected during the latter part of the evaluation of
the Personal Adviser Service pilot projects came from interviews with
clients and Personal Advisers across all twelve pilot areas.
A.1  Fieldwork areas
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The preliminary stage in the fieldwork involved visits to local Benefits
Agency and Employment Service offices outside the main fieldwork areas,
to enable the researchers to gain basic knowledge about procedures and
working arrangements.
The main fieldwork involved visits to Benefits Agency, Employment
Service and Personal Adviser Offices in the main fieldwork areas, to
conduct small group discussions and interviews with invited staff.  There
are examples of topic guides used to steer discussions in Appendix B.
Staff were identified and invited to participate by the project management
team working from the Department of Social Security.  Staff from the
Benefits Agency included section managers, team leaders, decision makers
and short-term benefit raters.  The raters and decision-makers shared
responsibilities for decision-making and implementation of therapeutic
work and voluntary work provision.  They dealt with contacts with
general practitioners, and  might have experience of contacts with other
agencies or employers, in respect of these measures.  Team leaders knew
how in-coming telephone enquiries about these measures were dealt
with; how notifications of Work Trial were dealt with; and possibly how
notifications of incapacity earnings provision applications might be dealt
with, although this had been little used.  They also knew how staff dealt
with the 52 week linking rule.
Staff invited from the Employment Service included Disability
Employment Advisers, who had on their caseloads people claiming
incapacity benefits who were looking for work.  They were also a point
of reference with Jobcentres for enquiries from other clients who were
sick or disabled but might be interested in the idea of working in the
future.  They are important in the dissemination of general information
to the population of interest.  They could set up Work Trial or help
clients access Jobfinder’s Grant or Jobmatch.  They also advised clients
who believed that their claim to incapacity benefits might end when
they next took an All Work Test, and were starting to look ahead to
work.  Other Employment Service’s staff invited included new claims
advisers, and general advisers.  These were front-line staff who might
have a role in identifying disabled clients who were thinking of working,
and might be the first contact for incapacity benefits claimants who had
been advised by other agencies to make enquiries about work
opportunities.  Also invited were some New Deal Advisers for people
aged 18-24 years, who might have had relevant experience or information
for this study.
Personal Advisers in the pilot projects were known to discuss the measures
with clients, and some of those working in projects led by the Employment
Service had direct responsibilities in terms of arranging access to Work
Trial, Jobfinder’s Grant and Jobmatch.
A.2  Discussions with
administrative staff
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Most of the discussions and interviews with staff in this phase of the
research took place at the end of 1999.  The overall contacts achieved are
shown in Table A.1.
Table A.1  Discussions with administrative staff
Benefits Employment Personal
Agency Ser vice Advisers
Preliminary research, outside main fieldwork 3 2 -
Main fieldwork
Area with Employment Service
Personal Adviser Service 3 - 3
Area with Contract
Personal Adviser Service 4 2 2
Two areas without Personal Adviser Service 6 4 -
Total 16 8 5
Drawing a sample of clients who had used one or more of the measures
proved a complex task.  The benefit-related provisions (therapeutic work,
voluntary work and incapacity earnings provision) were administered by
the Benefits Agency. Work Trial, Jobfinder’s Grant and Jobmatch were
Employment Service programmes.  Drawing a sample involved liaison
with individual offices in addition to using the project monitoring team’s
own database.  A further issue was that in some areas it was not possible
to use Benefits Agency administrative records to distinguish clients who
had done therapeutic work from those who had done voluntary work,
without considerable manual searching.  In addition, take-up of some of
the measures remained low, which meant that it was hard to reach quotas
in each local area, and that there were issues of client confidentiality.
Policy-makers’ decision to increase the focus on therapeutic work
provision made it easier to achieve quotas on the other measures.  A fifth
fieldwork area was introduced into the study, but in the event it proved
hard to achieve interviews in this area.
Letters explaining the purpose of the study were sent, and after a period
in which people who did not want to take part could opt out, the
researchers contacted clients and invited them to take part in an interview.
A study group was built to include people who had used at least one of
the measures (except the linking rule).  Attention was paid to the gender
balance in the group, and the aim was to include people across the age
range, with experience of all the main incapacity benefits.  Most of the
interviews with clients were conducted in April/ May 2000.
Overall, recruitment was harder than in other comparable projects, for
example the evaluation of the Personal Adviser Service.  Despite the
various problems, 34 interviews were achieved, with successful coverage
across the six incentive measures.  Most of the clients lived in areas with
a Personal Adviser Service.
A.3  Interviews with clients
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Table A.2  The client study group
Area with Area without Area with Area without
ES     PAS ES     PAS contract PAS PAS
Users of:
Therapeutic work 3 3 4 n/a
Voluntary work 2 2 2 n/a
Incapacity earnings provision n/a 2 2 n/a
Work Trial 1 1 1 2
Jobfinder’s Grant 2 1 1 0
Jobmatch 3 1 1 n/a
Key:ES - Employment Service; PAS - Personal Adviser Service; n/a -no clients identified to researchers
0 - no interviews achieved
In general, the interviews went well.  It became clear that many clients
heard about some measures for the first time from the researcher.  The
researchers left benefit leaflets, where relevant, or wrote down the names
of the measures for clients who wanted to find out more.  The researchers
also explained how information and advice about the measures might be
sought at local Benefits Agency offices, Jobcentres or the Personal Adviser
Service.  There is a copy of the topic guide in Appendix B.
The profile of personal characteristics of the client study group is presented
in Table A.3.
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Table A.3  Profile of the client study group
Study group
Age and gender Men Women
22 - 30 years 1 4
31 - 40 years 5 1
41 - 50 years 4 4
51 - 59 years 5 7
no information 1 2
Total 16 18
Family circumstances
living alone 6
living with a carer 1
lone parent 4
living with partner:
without children 8
with children 8
with adult children 2
living in parents’ household 4
living in shared accommodation 1
Incapacity benefits claimed immediately before or during use of measure:
Incapacity Benefit (with and without Income Support) 25
Severe Disablement Allowance (with and without Income Support) 3
Income Support only 3
National Insurance credits only 2
unclear 1
Groups included four people of minority ethnic origin
Towards the end of the research project the research team convened a
group of staff from the Benefits Agency, Employment Service and New
Deal pilots to discuss and reflect on a number of policy ideas under
consideration after the other fieldwork had been completed.
A group of nine officers met in August 2000 in York.  The group
comprised:
• 3 Benefits Agency incapacity benefit decision makers
• 3 Benefits Agency incapacity benefit raters
• 2 New Deal for Disabled People Personal Advisers
• 1 Employment Service Disability Employment Adviser
The group was given a short presentation summarising some of the key
findings emerging from the research and setting out the policy context
for the discussions to follow.  Participants were primed in advance of the
day to consider the following questions:
• which kinds of work incentives might be helpful in the new working
and claiming environment?
A.4  Group exercise with
administrative staff
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• what are the issues around work incentive measures for claimants and
staff?
• what obstacles remain within the benefit system, and what would be
needed to remove these?
Small group discussions were held in the morning and the group met for
a plenary session in the afternoon.  The discussions were moderated by
two members of the research team and were tape recorded with permission
and transcribed for analysis.
R elevant material from 60 interviews with clients, and a number of
discussions with Personal Advisers, conducted during the latter part of
the evaluation of the Personal Adviser Pilot Projects (late 1999 - April/
May 2000) had already been extracted during the parallel analysis, and
was available for integration.
A.5  Additional material
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SOCIAL POLICY RESEARCH UNIT
RESEARCH ON INCAPACITY BENEFITS AND WORK INCENTIVES
Discussion with Benefits Agency staff
Introduction
Thanks for spending time.
Check receipt of letter from DSS, introducing the research: clarification or explanation required?
Check that the topics for discussion are appropriate.
Explain how findings will be reported; emphasise confidentiality.
Seek permission for use of tape-recorder.
GUIDE FOR DISCUSSION
The overall project is concerned with seven measures that may provide some incentive to work for
people claiming incapacity benefits:
the 52 week linking rule
voluntary work provision
therapeutic work provision
Work Trial
Incapacity Earnings provision
Jobfinder’s Grant
Jobmatch
The last four measures only became available to people claiming incapacity benefits in April this
year, and are being piloted in the [....] area.  They have not been much used so far, and you may
have limited experience of them, but anything you can tell us will be helpful.
Could we start with you introducing yourselves, for the tape-recording, and then quickly summarising
your own role and level of involvement with these measures?
Now I would like us to focus on each of the seven measures in turn.
52 week linking rule
How is the 52 week linking rule put into operation?
What guidance do you refer to; how helpful is this?
Have there been any problems for staff, for example complex decisions?
How do people claiming, or previously claiming,  incapacity benefits get to know about the rule,
and the time limits for notification?
Do you have a picture of the circumstances of people who have used the linking rule?
Do you know of any problems for people who have tried to use the linking rule?
How well do you think this rule is working:
as an incentive to people to try work?
as a form of security for people who have to leave work?
Are you able to compare the current rule with its predecessor (pre-October 1998)?
Therapeutic work provision
What is the process of decision-making about allowing the therapeutic work provision?
Do you have a picture of the circumstances of people who want to do therapeutic work?
How do people get to know about therapeutic work?
What are the main influences on decisions about whether to allow therapeutic work?
Are there particular problems for staff?
Are there particular problems for people who want to do therapeutic work?
How are reviews dealt with?
How effective do you think this measure is:
as an incentive for people to try work?
as a ‘stepping-stone’ to work?
in improving, preventing or delaying deterioration in condition?
Do you know what employers think about the therapeutic work provision?
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Jobfinder’s Grant and Jobmatch
How have you learned about these measures?
What is the involvement of Benefits Agency staff when people on incapacity benefits use Jobfinder’s
Grant or Jobmatch?
Are employers contacted?
How are payments actually made?
Do the staff promote or advertise these measures? How?
Do you know of any problems for:
people wanting to use these measures
Benefits Agency staff
employers
How effective do you think these measures might be as an incentive for people on incapacity
benefits to try work?
Are there any pointers from what is happening with Jobseeker’s Allowance claimants who can use
these measures?
Looking across the measures
As well as considering how each of the measures is working, there are some general issues to talk
about:
What are the links between any of these measures and any Benefits Agency or Employment Service
medical controls of incapacity?
How are such links perceived or assumed by people claiming incapacity benefits? How might this
affect use of the measures, or enquiries about them?
Are the measures generally advertised or promoted in local Benefits Agency offices?
What are your views, in general, on liaison with the New Deal for Disabled People Personal
Adviser Service in respect of these measures?
How might any of these measures be made more effective?
Have you any other suggestions about improving incentives for people claiming incapacity benefits
to try work?
Voluntary work
How does the process of decision-making about voluntary work compare with what happens for
the therapeutic work provision?
Do you have a picture of the circumstances of people who want to do voluntary work?
How do people claiming incapacity benefits get to know about the voluntary work provision?
Are there particular problems for:
staff?
people who want to do voluntary work?
How are reviews dealt with?
How well do you think this measure is working:
as an incentive for people to try some activity/ work?
as a ‘stepping-stone’ to work?
in improving quality of life?
Do you know what the views are of those organisations who ‘employ’ people on  incapacity
benefits as volunteers?
Incapacity earnings provision
How familiar are you with the rules for this measure? What is your main source of information?
What is the process of decision-making about allowing the incapacity earnings provision?
Have you dealt with any applications for this measure, or any enquiries about it?
Do the staff promote or advertise this measure? How?
Take-up of this measure, generally, has been low.  Can you suggest any reasons for this?
How does this measure compare with the therapeutic earnings provision, as a potential incentive to
try work?
Work Trial
How have you learned about this measure for people claiming incapacity benefits?
What is the involvement of Benefits Agency staff when people on incapacity benefits enter the
Work Trial programme?
Have you dealt with anybody claiming incapacity benefits on this programme, or any enquiries
about it?
Do the staff promote or advertise this measure? How?
Again, take-up of this measure has been low so far.  Can you suggest any reasons for this?
How effective do you think this measure might be as an incentive to try work for people on
incapacity benefits?
Are there any pointers from what is happening in the Work Trial programme for people claiming
Jobseeker’s Allowance?
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Topic guide for interviews with clients
March 2000
1. INTRODUCTION
remind about SPRU; research funded by DSS
explain purpose of research: to throw light on the views and experiences of people who have claimed incapacity
benefits and used or tried to use one/ some of the arrangements in place to help them work
explain the issues which will be included in the discussion (use list overleaf)
discussion will last around one and a half hours - need for breaks etc?
reassure confidentiality; permission to use tape-recorder
reassure no effect on benefits, or any future dealings with DSS or ES
questions, concerns etc.
give money gift
2. RECENT WORK AND CLAIMING CIRCUMSTANCES
(Use this introductory section to establish current work situation and main sources of income;
recent incapacity benefits claim;  steps in the move towards work, and which of the relevant
measures have been used or attempted.)
First of all, may I ask who there is in your household?
What is your current situation (and your partner’s situation) in respect to work outside the home?
- we are interested in unpaid or voluntary work as well as paid work.
May I ask your age? (and your partner’s)
Your name was chosen because you had some experience of claiming incapacity benefits in the past
year.
(Use this section to get an overview; to establish recent chronology of claim, to establish which of
the measures have been used, or attempted.  The client will use their own words to describe these.
Try not to introduce the official terms yourself, until the end of the section, where you agree with
the client which measures will be the focus of the discussion following, i.e. which have been used,
and which have been attempted but not achieved.)
May I ask you:
which benefit(s), date of claim
reason for claiming: aspects of ill-health/ impairment that led to claiming incapacity benefits
if claim has ended, date and reason
if claim ended by move to work, is this the current job?
SOCIAL POLICY RESEARCH UNIT
INCAPACITY BENEFITS AND WORK INCENTIVES
Topic guide for interviews with clients
Overview of discussion
1. Introduction
2. R ecent work and claiming experiences
3. Experience of trying/ going back to work
4. Knowledge and understanding of benefit rules and payments used (or attempted)
5. Setting up these arrangements
6. Experience and views of the arrangement(s) used
7. Views and experiences of other benefit rules and payments
8. Views and experiences of ‘linking rule’
9. Overall evaluation of these arrangements
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And have you had any experience during the past year of claiming incapacity benefit and doing
some work at the same time? Or trying to do this?
(Enable client to explain in own words first. Establish which arrangements have been used/ attempted.
May be necessary to emphasise that you mean arrangements that are allowed, not fraud. Then
confirm official terms, if necessary: therapeutic work, voluntary work, incapacity earnings provision,
WorkTrial and say you will talk in more detail later about this/ these. If others are mentioned, e.g.
Work Preparation, or work placement, express interest, and be alert for comparisons etc. in what
follows.)
And have you had any experience during the past year of receiving extra money on moving into
work, in addition to wages? Or trying to do this?
(Enable client to explain in own words first. Establish which arrangements have been used/ attempted.
Then confirm official terms if necessary: Jobfinder’s Grant, Jobmatch, WFTC, DPTC, Family
Credit, DWA and say you will talk in more detail later about this/ these. If others are mentioned,
e.g. Access to Work payments for fares, aids/ adaptations, express interest, and be alert for comparisons
references in what follows.)
May I ask how your income is made up, overall? (and domestic partner)
In general, how would you describe your financial situation at the moment?
3. EXPERIENCE OF TRYING OR GOING BACK TO WORK
Have you had any advice or support recently, in respect of trying or going back to work, from
incapacity benefits. I mean during the last year.
What have been the main reasons for wanting to try/ go back to work?
Have there been any problems in trying or going back to work?
4. KNOWLEDGE AND UNDERSTANDING OF ARRANGEMENTS USED OR ATTEMPTED
Now I would like us to concentrate on the (name) arrangement that you told me you
had used (attempted) during the past year
For each of the relevant 6 measures identified in section 2 as used, now ask sections 4, 5 and 6.
For each of the relevant 6 measures identified in section 2 as attempted but not achieved, now ask
sections 4 and 5.
Leave discussion of FC, DWA, WFTC or DPTC until later.
How did you know about (name)?
When did you start to think about using it?
What did you understand about it?
Did you think it might be useful to you?
Did you have any concerns about it?
Did you discuss it with anybody while you were thinking about it?
What made you decide to go ahead?
Did knowing about it influence decisions you were making about working?
5. SETTING UP THE ARRANGEMENT
Now can we talk about setting up/ trying to set up the arrangement:
How did you try to get or get on (name)?
In general, how easy was it to set this up?
How appropriate was the time-scale in setting it up?
If attempt to set up/ arrange failed; explore reason and impact
6. EXPERIENCE AND VIEWS OF ARRANGEMENT(S) USED
I would like to know more about your experience and views about doing/ using (name measure)
Did it help you?
Was the time-scale of the arrangement appropriate?
Views on payments received (Jobfinder’s Grant, Jobmatch, Incapacity earnings provision)
Were there any disadvantages, or problems?
Is what happened what you had expected?
What do you think would have happened without this arrangement? work decisions; financial
implications
7. VIEWS AND EXPERIENCE OF OTHER MEASURES
May we talk now about some of the other benefit arrangements and extra payments that
have been available during the past year, to help people who have been claiming incapacity
benefits and would like to do some work.
Then use questions for specific measures to explore those not already fully discussed:
i) Have you heard of therapeutic work? (prompt if necessary: therapeutic earnings)
If YES:
How did you hear about it?
Do you know how it works?
Have you ever thought about doing therapeutic work yourself?
If knowledge is scanty or wrong, offer correct information from card, and then ask if this changes their views.
If NO, have NOT heard of therapeutic work, explain briefly, using card.
Ask all:
Do you think you might consider doing therapeutic work in the future?
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If YES:
How did you hear about this?
Do you know about the rules for doing voluntary work?
Have you thought about doing voluntary work yourself, while claiming incapacity benefits?
If knowledge is scanty or wrong, offer  correct information from card, and then ask if this changes their views.
If NO, have NOT heard people on incapacity benefits can do voluntary work, explain briefly using card.
Ask all:
Do you think you might consider doing voluntary work in the future if you are claiming incapacity
benefits?
iii) Have you heard of incapacity earnings provision?
If YES:
How did you hear about that?
Do you know how that arrangement works?
Have you thought about using incapacity earnings provision yourself?
If knowledge is scanty or wrong, offer correct information from card and then ask if this changes their views.
If NO, have NOT heard of incapacity earnings provision, explain briefly using card.
Ask all:
Do you think you might consider using something similar to this, in the future?
iv) Have you heard of WorkTrial?
If YES:
How did you hear about this?
Do you know how it works?
Have you thought about using WorkTrial yourself?
If knowledge is scanty or wrong, offer correct information from card and then ask if this changes their views.
If NO, have NOT heard of WorkTrial, explain briefly using card.
Ask all:
Do you think you might consider something like WorkTrial in the future?
v) Have you heard of Jobfinder’s Grant?
If YES:
How did you hear about that?
Do you know how that arrangement works?
Have you thought about using Jobfinder’s Grant yourself?
If knowledge is scanty or wrong, offer correct information from card and then ask if this changes their views.
If NO, have NOT heard of Jobfinder’s Grant, explain briefly using card.
Ask all:
Do you think you might consider using this, or something similar, in the future?
vi) Have you heard of JobMatch?
If YES:
How did you hear about this?
Do you know how it works?
Have you thought about using JobMatch yourself?
If knowledge is scanty or wrong, offer correct information from card and then ask if this changes their views.
If NO, have NOT heard of JobMatch, explain briefly using card.
Ask all:
Do you think you might consider something similar to JobMatch in the future?
vii) Tax credits - WFTC and DPTC
If client is currently claiming WFTC or DPTC, now ask Section 6 adapting questions appropriately.
Ask those not currently claiming:
Have you heard of Working Families’ Tax Credit/ Disabled Person’s Tax Credit - these
have replaced similar arrangements called Family Credit and Disability Working
Allowance?
If YES:
How did you hear about this?
Do you know how it  works?
Have you thought about using this yourself?
If knowledge is scanty or wrong, offer correct information from card and then ask if this changes their views.
If NO, have NOT heard of WFTC/ DPTC explain briefly using card.
Ask all:
Do you think you might consider Working Families’ Tax Credit/ Disabled Person’s Tax Credit or
something similar in the future?
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8. VIEWS AND EXPERIENCES OF LINKING RULES
There is another kind of arrangement that might help people who would like to try
work. Have you heard of linking rules? Prompt: I mean, being able to go back to the same
benefits if a job does not work out?
If YES:
Note that client may recognise 52 week rule and/ or the DPTC linking rule. There may be confusion
here. Try to focus on 52 week rule - if necessary, deal with each separately -
How did you hear about it?
Do you know how it works?
Ask those currently or recently in work:
May I just check, did you know about it before you started that work? Did knowing about it
influence your taking that job? In what way?
Has it applied to you? I mean, have you used the linking rule to go back to incapacity benefits?
If have heard, but knowledge is scanty or wrong, offer correct information from card.
If NO, have NOT heard of linking rule, give brief details of rules for 52 week link, from card
Ask all:
Do you think the linking rule might be helpful to you in the future?
Ask those not working:
Does knowing about this linking rule affect how you feel about work?
9. OVERALL PERCEPTIONS OF SPECIAL MEASURES
I would like to end by talking generally about these benefit rules and extra payments.
(Interviewer recap: measures used, measures attempted unsuccessfully and measures thought about but not used.)
Looking back, how much did they influence how you thought about working?
Which was the most influential?
Looking back, would you have liked to know more about any of those we have talked about?
What would have been the best way of getting the information to you?
Again, looking across what you knew about them, how influential were they on what you did?
I mean the decisions you made, and actions you took?
Now that we have talked about a number of different arrangements, do you think any of your ideas
about working or claiming incapacity benefits have changed at all?
What are your current expectations or plans about working?
The government is looking for ways to improve rules and payments of this kind, to help people
who have been on incapacity benefits and would like to do some work.  Have you any suggestions?
Thank you very much for taking part in this.  Your views are valuable.
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